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Abstract
Today’s consumer mobile platforms such as Android and iOS manage large ecosys-
tems of untrusted third-party applications. It is common for an application to request
one or more types of sensitive data. Unfortunately, users have no insight into how
their data is used. Given the sensitivity of the data accessible by these applications,
it is paramount that mobile operating systems prevent apps from leaking it.
This dissertation shows that it is possible to improve the soundness of dynamic
information-flow tracking on a mobile device without sacrificing precision, perfor-
mance, or transparency. We extend the state of the art in dynamic information-flow
tracking on Android and address two major limitations: quantifying implicit flow
leaks in Dalvik bytecode and tracking explicit flows in native code. Our goal is to
deliver seamless end-to-end taint tracking across Dalvik bytecode and native code.
We propose SpanDex, a system that quantifies implicit flow leaks in Dalvik byte-
code for apps handling password data. SpanDex computes a bound of revealed
tainted data by recording the control-flow dependencies and for each password char-
acter, keeps track of the possible set of values that have been inferred. We also
propose TaintTrap, a taint tracking system for native code in third party apps.
We explore native taint tracking performance bottlenecks and hardware acceleration
techniques to improve instrumentation performance.
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Chapter 1
Dynamic Information-Flow
Tracking
1.1 Introduction
There is a clear need for privacy and security in computer systems. A modern
example comes from widespread adoption and usage of popular mobile devices such
as smartphones and tablets. Users store increasing amounts of sensitive information
on their personal devices but also make use of applications (apps) that do not offer
privacy guarantees. Growing reports of security breaches, confidential and personal
information leaks are now common events.
Current mobile OS’s such as iOS or Android, provide the user the option of
granting or denying access to certain types of information (e.g. location, contacts,
photos). This leaves the user deciding whether to trust an app will not leak their
sensitive information. Once an app is granted permissions, the user has no guarantee
the same permissions are not used in a way that either intentionally or unintentionally
leaks sensitive information.
The underlying problem in todays mobile devices is that they make no guarantees
in secure information-flow. As defined by the pioneering work of Denning [1] in the
70s, secure information-flow means no unauthorized flow of information is possible.
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1.2 Motivation
Although there is a vast range of previous work on dynamic information-flow tracking
(DIFT), their design goals and decisions were done in a very different context. One
of the major distinctions is the environment: desktop versus smartphone. Unlike a
desktop, a smartphone has different usage scenarios, more limited performance and is
under strict battery constraints. We aim for a system that is continuously monitoring
and protecting sensitive data and doing so without incurring an overhead that impairs
users device interaction. In our view, the user does not trust the application developer
with safe guarding sensitive data stored on the device from being leaked to external
parties. Coupled with the vibrant app ecosystem on smartphones, we need a tracking
system that can support unmodified app binaries whether from official or third party
app stores.
To summarize, we argue for a practical smartphone DIFT system with the fol-
lowing properties:
• Full-system end-to-end dynamic information-flow tracking: support across OS,
libraries and application code.
• Low performance overhead: minimal impact on noticeable user device perfor-
mance.
• High tracking precision: fine-granularity accurate taint tracking (low false pos-
itives) and multiple taint markings.
• Online continuous monitoring and protection.
• No app developer burden (e.g. annotations).
• No application source code required.
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In delivering a smartphone tracking system none of the prior works offer a prac-
tical system with all the desirable properties outlined above. Other work has ex-
tensively addressed some of the properties we seek but they are either unable to
cover all the properties, have significant limitations or their performance overheads
are not suitable for real-time usage on a smartphone. We think the time is ideal for
providing such a desirable DIFT system.
In this work we focus specifically on the popular Android platform, mostly be-
cause it offers complete source code on which we can build on. Android provides a
powerful mix of features: garbage collection (GC), virtual machine (VM), just-in-
time (JIT) compilation and native code (ARM). All of these can have very different
impact and requirements with respect to information-flow tracking, both in tracking
granularity and overhead. Leveraging these features efficiently is one of our main
goals.
We first discuss at a high level the motivation and challenges for the system
properties we chose:
Full-system end-to-end DIFT Most prior work addresses application level
information-flow. Moreover apps interact with the underlying system in many ways
that could leak information. On Android, apps are composed of Dalvik bytecode
running inside a VM and can optionally include native ARM code. In order to
ensure strong privacy guarantees a DIFT system needs to be end-to-end, covering all
interactions both between and within the OS and app layers. In the case of Android,
we specifically need taint tracking across the OS, filesystem, network, Dalvik VM and
across native code. To address this, in this paper we are extending the TaintDroid
platform with precise native code taint tracking.
3
Low performance overhead If a DIFT system is to monitor sensitive infor-
mation and provide privacy guarantees, it holds that the system needs to be contin-
uously aware of any sensitive flows. One way current systems approach this is by
instrumenting all machine instructions with additional instructions required to prop-
agate and update taint. Generally these instructions occur regardless of any tainted
data actually being propagated and they can incur very significant overheads. While
for certain types of data flow or security analyses the performance overhead might
not be a limiting factor, in the case of smartphones performance is critical. Not only
is performance capability very limited on a smartphone compared to a desktop but
the types of apps running on a device are generally highly interactive. This prohibits
the use of systems that significantly increase overhead making device interaction
extremely slow and unusable.
To reduce DIFT performance, some systems propose hardware extensions. In
general, the hardware associates tags with each memory location and register, and
propagates the tags in hardware, without any additional instrumentation overhead.
These systems are generally limited to 1-bit tags with prohibitive overheads for multi-
bit tags and have inflexible taint propagation rules. The drawback is that the require-
ment on highly specialized hardware limits wide-spread deployment and adoption,
and the flexibility is generally constrained over a software approach. We believe a
more interesting middle ground is in hybrid solutions that minimally extend or re-
purpose existing hardware together with software for high flexibility. In this work
we favor the latter hybrid approach.
Online continuous monitoring and protection A key goal is to offer reg-
ular users a system that runs in real-time on their smartphone, watches and safe-
guards sensitive data at all times. Continuously running a typical heavy-weight
DIFT system is not feasible especially on a severely resource constrained devices
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such as smartphones. We believe there is an opportunity to meet the goal of having
continuous execution while still maintaing useable device performance by specifically
tuning DIFT for Android with variable taint tracking granularity (e.g. file, parcel,
object, field, variable and instruction levels).
High tracking precision The majority of DIFT systems offer only the ability
to label or tag data with a single bit, representing trusted or untrusted data. While
this is sufficient to detect some security attacks or leaks, it is not suitable for providing
a rich policy set. Having more tag expressiveness by raising the number of bits per
tag can accommodate for more user-focused policies: a user may consider sharing
his coarse grain location with certain apps but not his fine-grain location, or may
chose to explicitly deny apps the ability to send out his phone number or contacts
without explicit approval, while allowing other information such as his IMEI that
is generally used for advertisement tracking purposes. These policies could require
around 5 bits (encoding 32 different types of tainted data). On the high end of tag
expressiveness, using a full 32-bit tag can enable not just leak detection but precise
flow tracking, determining what path a piece of data takes from its first use to its
point of exit from the system. These types of analyses are called information-flow
data tomography and can be very powerful.
No developer burden Some previously proposed systems offload to the de-
veloper the burden of annotating their programs. There are various approaches: rely
on special information-flow programming languages and having to annotate sensi-
tive data with labels, might be required to include and link against some special
IFT aware libraries in their code to allow the platform to intercept sensitive flows,
rely on a specially modified compiler to compute and verify program labels. While
these approaches may be suitable for some applications, in our case where users can
5
easily install applications from the many hundreds of thousands available in the app
stores, it is infeasible to expect all developers will perform the extra effort. More-
over, it is likely the user does not trust the app developer with properly making such
changes. The user is much more likely to trust the platform (Google in the case
of Android or Apple for iOS) or a subset of the platform, responsible for enforcing
privacy mechanisms. Thus in this work we are designing a system that does not
require the user trust the developer or the developer perform extra effort to support
a DIFT smartphone system.
No application source code required In a similar view to the previous
property of no developer burden, we also make the important observation that even
though some DIFT systems may not require developer burden, they still rely on
the application source code to automatically instrument the original source code
before running it. This is a major barrier as most applications offered on app stores,
although free, do not offer their source code as well. Requiring source code is thus a
significant limitation for a practical smartphone DIFT system. The user should never
have to worry about these aspects and instead should expect the underlying system
will function correctly and protect their data at all times regardless of what apps they
install and from what sources. That being said, we note that although app source
code is not available, we are free to modify or statically instrument the available app
binary. For instance, we consider the one-time cost of binary rewriting acceptable.
In the case of Android, the system already does some binary optimizations the first
time an app is installed so it is possible we perform additional rewriting for taint
tracking purposes.
6
1.2.1 Android
Android is a open source mobile device platform. The Android OS is Linux-based
and it offers support for third party applications built on top of the platform. Apps
are written in Java and compiled to Dalvik EXecutable (DEX) bytecode. Apps can
also include optional C libraries and C code is compiled to ARM assembly. Each
application runs in its own process which includes a Dalvik VM.
Dalvik VM Interpreter Dalvik VM process DEX bytecode in a register-based
machine. The registers and stack are managed internally by the VM. Unlike other
register-based machines like x86, Dalvik long-term storage is in the form of class
fields as opposed to storing in memory locations. This property helps with taint
propagation. For performance, Android also includes a just-in-time (JIT) compiler
starting with Android 2.3.
Native Methods Android applications can be partially or fully written in C
and compiled to native ARM assembly. This use case is common practice for Android
platform libraries, 3rd party libraries such as OpenGL and Webkit, games or perfor-
mance critical code. Until now, native code support for taint tracking on Android
has been a limitation. There are two types of native methods: VM internal methods
and JNI methods. The VM internal methods are used for interpreter structures and
operation while the JNI implement the Java Native Interface standard [2].
Current Android tracking systems support only applications running inside the
Dalvik VM. Taint tracking inside a VM has practical benefits: low performance
overhead due to operation on Dalvik bytecode as opposed to lower level ARM in-
structions, isolation and metadata rich execution environment.
On the other hand, running native code escapes the VM and the benefits are
lost at the gain of increased application performance. Malware applications can
7
circumvent the VM taint tracking system by simply running native code.
Binder IPC The Android IPC system is Binder. A Binder IPC library runs
in userspace while a kernel module manages communication between processes. The
messaging unit in Binder is a parcel.
3
IPC overhead while extending the analysis system-
wide. Third, for system-provided native libraries, we use
method-level tracking. Here, we run native code without
instrumentation and patch the taint propagation on re-
turn. These methods accompany the system and have
known information flow semantics. Finally, we use file-
level tracking to ensure persistent information conserva-
tively retains its taint markings.
To assign labels, we take advantage of the well-
defined interfaces through which applications access
sensitive data. For example, all information retrieved
from GPS hardware is location-sensitive, and all in-
formation retrieved from an address book database is
contact-sensitive. This avoids relying on heuristics or
manual specification for labels.
In order to achieve this tracking at multiple granu-
larities, our approach relies on the firmware’s integrity.
The taint tracking system’s trusted computing base in-
cludes the virtual machine executing in userspace and
any native system libraries loaded by the untrusted
interpreted application. However, this code is part of
the firmware, and is therefore trusted. Applications can
only escape the virtual machine by executing native
methods. In our target platform (Android), we modified
the native library loader to ensure that applications can
only load native libraries from the firmware and not
those downloaded by the application. We leave dealing
with third-party native libraries as future work.
In summary, we provide a novel, efficient, system-
wide, multiple-marking, taint tracking design by com-
bining multiple granularities. While some techniques
such as variable tracking within an interpreter have been
previously proposed (see Section 9), to our knowledge,
our approach is the first to extend such tracking system-
wide. By choosing a multiple-granularity approach, we
balance performance and accuracy.
3 BACKGROUND: ANDROID
Android is a Linux-based, open source, mobile phone
platform. Most core phone functionality is implemented
as applications running on top of a customized middle-
ware. Applications are written in Java and compiled to
a custom byte-code format known as Dalvik EXecutable
(DEX). Each application executes within its own Dalvik
VM interpreter instance. Each instance executes as a
unique UNIX user identity to isolate applications within
the Linux platform. Applications communicate via the
binder IPC subsystem. The following discusses topics
necessary to understand our tracking system.
Dalvik VM Interpreter: DEX is a register-based machine
language, as opposed to Java byte-code, which is stack-
based. Each DEX method has its own predefined number
of virtual registers (which we frequently refer to as
simply “registers”). The Dalvik VM interpreter manages
method registers with an internal execution state stack;
the current method’s registers are always on the top
stack frame. These registers loosely correspond to local
Dalvik VM
Interpreter
Trusted Application Untrusted Application
Trusted Library
Virtual Taint Map
Taint Source
Taint Sink
Binder IPC Library Binder Hook
Binder Kernel Module
Dalvik VM
InterpreterVirtual Taint Map
Binder IPC LibraryBinder Hook
(1)
(2) (3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
Native Methods. [WHE: say a little about how Dalvik
creates a byte-array of arguments that is passed. internal
VM vs JNI. significanlty more JNI than internal VM (more
internal VM ethods is unlikely). mention call bridge]
Android contains two types of native methods: internal
VM methods and JNI methods. The internal VM methods
access interpreter specific structures and APIs, whereas
JNI methods conform to Java native interface standards
specifications [cite]. The specifications include passing Java
arguments to JNI methods as separate variables, which is
performed automatically by a call bridge in Dalvik. Internal
VM methods do not have this luxury and manually parse
arguments from a byte array of arguments created by the
interpreter.
Android’s middleware Java libraries make frequent use
of the Java Native Interface (JNI). The native methods are
written in C and C++ and expose the POSIX functionality
provided by the underlying Linux kernel and services. An-
droid uses the Apache Harmony implementation of Java [12]
for base Java functionality in the Dalvik VM. Portions of
the Apache Harmony implementation wraps system libraries
(e.g., math libraries) to provide functionality. The Android
binder and parcel interfaces also make use of JNI. Fur-
thermore, A droid uses JNI to ncludes Java interf ces to
third party libraries such as OpenGL and Web it. Finally,
Android provides the Native Developm nt Toolkit (NDK)
to allow third party application developers to implement
and package native libraries with downloaded applications.
However, NDK use is strongly discouraged, as it impedes
application portability on a platform that runs on different
instruction set architectures, including ARM and x86. The
NDK is primarily seen as a means of providing better
runtime performance.
IV. TAINTDROID ARCHITECTURE
TaintDroid is a system that performs system-wide taint
tracking built upon Android. Figure 2 shows TaintDroid
architecture. TaintDroid propagates taint tags within an
application and between applications.
The goal of TaintDroid is to perform taint to tracking to
enforce security polices to untrusted third-party applic tions.
For correct taint tracki g, TaintDroid’s trusted computing
base includes the firmware, including all system applica-
tions and libraries provided by the stock Android distribu-
tion. Similar assumptions are made by other taint tracking
systems, e.g., Panorama [4]. In addition, we assume all
downloaded (i.e., unknown) code executes within the Dalvik
VM. We do not allow execution of downloaded native code,
which do not propagate taint tags or may maliciously modify
taint tag storage.
Figure 2 shows an example of taint tracking in TaintDroid.
Information is tainted (1) in a trusted a plica ion with
sufficient context (e.g., the location provider). The taint
interface invokes a native method (2) that interfaces with the
Trusted Application Untrusted Application
JNI Hook Binder Hook
DVM InterpreterDVM Intepreter
Binder Kernel Module
Virtual Taint Map Virtual Taint Map
Binder Hook
Trusted Library
JNI Hook
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Figure 2. TaintDroid Architecture
Dalvik VM interpreter, storing the specified taint marking(s)
in the virtual taint map. As the trusted application uses the
tainted information, the Dalvik VM propagates taint tags
(3) according to our data flow rules. When the trusted ap-
plication uses the tainted information in an IPC transaction,
the modified binder library (4) ensures the parcel message
carries a taint tag reflecting the combined taint markings
of all contained data. The parcel is passed transparently
through the kernel (5) and received by the remote untrusted
application. Note that the third-party interpreted code is
untrusted. The modified binder library retrieves the taint tag
from the parcel and assigns it to all values read from the
parcel (6). The remote Dalvik VM instance propagates taint
tags (7) identically for the untrusted application. When the
untrusted application invokes a library specified as a taint
sink (8), e.g., sending a data buffer over the network, the
library retrieves the taint tag for the data in question (9-11)
and makes a policy decision.
At a high level, TaintDroid architecture enables system-
wide tracking by combining execution taint tracking, IPC
taint tracking, native interface taint tracking, and secondary
storage taint tracking.
Variable-level taint tracking While previous approaches
such as Panorama [panorama] and TaintBochs [taintbochs]
provide high-accuracy taint tracking via instruction-level
taint propagation, performance is sacrificed. On the other
end of the spectrum, approaches such as PRECIP [precip]
consider only high-level system calls into the kernel, trading
off accuracy for performance; thus, they provide only nomi-
nal advantage over OS permissions (e.g., those implemented
in Android).
In TaintDroid, we choose a middle ground, variable-
level taint tracking. TaintDroid is designed to taint primitive
type variables (e.g., int, float, etc). Our taint source and
sink libraries (Section VI) provide an easy interface to set
and check the taint markings on primitive types. However,
there are cases when object references must become tainted
to ensure taint propagation operates correctly. Applications
are compiled into the Dalvik EXecutable (DEX) byte-code
format. Dalvik, unlike the stack-based virtual machine Java,
3
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VM vs JNI. significanlty more J I than i t r l
internal VM methods is unlikely). e ti c ll ri e]
A droid contains two types of native methods: internal
VM methods and JNI methods. The internal VM methods
access interpreter specific structures and APIs, whereas
JNI methods conform to Java native interface standards
specifications [cite]. The specifications include passing Java
arguments to JNI methods as separate variables, which is
performed automatically by a call bridge in Dalvik. Internal
VM methods do not have this luxury and manually parse
arguments from a byte array of arguments created by the
interp eter.
Android’s middleware Java libraries make frequent use
of the Java Native Interface (JNI). The native methods are
written in C and C++ and expose the POSIX functionality
provided by the underlying Linux kernel and services. An-
droid uses the Apache H rmony mplementation of Java [12]
for base Java functionality in the Dalvik VM. Portions of
the Apache Harmony implementation wraps system libraries
(e.g., math libraries) to provide functionality. The Android
binder an parcel interfaces also make use of JNI. Fur-
thermore, An roid uses JNI to includes Java interfaces to
third par y libraries such as OpenGL and Webkit. Finally,
Android provides the Native Development Toolkit (NDK)
to allow third party application developers to implement
and package native libraries with downloaded applications.
How ver, NDK use is strongly discouraged, as it impedes
application portability on a platform that runs on different
instruction set architectures, including ARM and x86. The
NDK is primarily seen as a means of providing better
runtime performance.
IV. TAINTDROID ARCHITECTURE
TaintDroid is a system that performs system-wide taint
tracking built u on An roid. Figure 2 shows T intDroid
architecture. TaintDroid propagates taint tags within an
application and between applications.
The goal of TaintDroid is to perform taint to tracking to
enforce security polices to untrusted third-party applications.
For correct taint tracking, TaintDroid’s trusted computing
b se includes the firmware, including all system applica-
tions and libraries provided by the stock Android distribu-
tion. Similar assumptions are made by other taint tracking
systems, e.g., Panorama [4]. In addition, we assume all
downloaded (i.e., unknown) c de executes within the alvik
VM. We do not llow execution of downlo ded native ode,
which do not propagate taint tags or may maliciously modify
taint tag storage.
Figure 2 shows an example of taint tracking in TaintDroid.
Information is tainted (1) in a trusted application with
sufficient context (e.g., the location provider). The taint
interface invokes a native method (2) that interfaces with the
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Dalvik VM interpreter, storing the specified taint marking(s)
in the virtual taint map. As the trusted application uses the
tainted information, the Dalvik VM propagates taint tags
(3) according to our data flow rules. When the trusted ap-
plication uses the tainted information in an IPC transaction,
the modified binder library (4) ensures the parcel message
carries a taint tag reflecting the combined taint markings
of all contained data. The parcel is passed transparently
through the kernel (5) and received by the remote untrusted
application. Note that the third-party interprete c de is
untrusted. The modifi d binder library retri ves the taint tag
from the parcel and assigns it to all values read from the
parcel (6). The remote Dalvik VM instance propagates taint
tags (7) identically for the untrusted application. When the
untrusted application invokes a library specified as a taint
sink (8), e.g., sending a data buffer over the network, the
library retrieves the taint tag for the data in question (9-11)
and makes a policy decision.
At a high level, TaintDroid architecture enables system-
wide tracking by combining execution taint tracking, IPC
taint tracking, native interface taint tracking, and secondary
storage taint tracking.
Variable-level taint tracki g While previous approaches
such as Panorama [panorama] and TaintBochs [taintbochs]
provide high-accuracy taint tracking via instruction-level
taint propagation, performance is sacrificed. On the other
end of the spectrum, approaches such as PRECIP [precip]
consider only high-level system calls into the kernel, trading
off accuracy for performance; thus, they provide only nomi-
nal advantage over OS permissions (e.g., those implemented
in Android).
In TaintDroid, we choose a middle ground, variabl -
level t int tracking. TaintDroid is designed to taint prim tive
typ variables (e.g., int, float, etc). Our taint source and
sink libraries (Section VI) provide an easy interface to set
and check the taint markings on primitive types. However,
there are cases when object references must become tainted
to ensure taint propagation operates correctly. Applications
are compiled into the Dalvik EXecutable (DEX) byte-code
format. Dalvik, unlike the stack-based virtual machine Java,
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JNI methods conform to Java native interface standards
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alvik interpreter, storing the specified taint marking(s)
in the virtual taint map. As the trusted applicat on uses the
tai te information, the Dalvik VM propagates taint tags
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Fig. 2. TaintDroid architecture within An roid.
variables in the Java method and store primitive types
and object references. All computation occurs on regis-
ters; therefore, values must be loaded from and stored to
class fields before and after use, respectively. Note that
DEX uses class fields for all long-term storage, unlike
hardwar register-based machine languages (e.g., x86),
which store values in a bitr ry memo y locations. Thi
additional context aids t i t propagation in our design.
As of Android 2.3, the Dalvik VM contains a just-in-
time compiler (JIT) to boost performance by translati g
byte-code to optimiz d native cod at run-time.
Native Methods: The Android middleware provides
access to native libraries for performance optimiza ion
and to supp rt third-party libraries such as Op nGL
and Webkit. Native ethods are written in C/C++ and
expose functionality provided by the underlying Linux
OS. They can also access Java internals, and hence are
included in our trusted computing base (Section 2).
Android contains two typ s of native methods: in-
ternal VM methods and JNI m thods. The int rnal VM
methods access interpreter-specific structures and APIs.
JNI methods conform to Java native interface sta dards
specifications [21], which requires Dalvik to separate
Java arguments into variables using a JNI call bridge.
Conversely, internal VM methods must manually parse
arguments from the interpreter’s byte array of argu-
ments. This difference impacts our design.
Binder IPC: Android’s IPC subsystem is called binder.
Fundamental to binder are parcels, which serialize both
active and standard data objects. The former includes
references to bi der objects, which allows the framework
to manage s ared dat objects between proces es. A
binder kernel module passes parcels betw en processes.
4 TAINTDROID
TaintDroid is a realizati n of our multiple-granularity
taint tracking ppr ach within Android. TaintDroid uses
variable-level tracking within the VM interpreter. Mul-
tiple taint markings are stored as one taint tag. When
applications execute native methods, variable taint tags
are patched on return. Finally, taint tags are assigned to
parcels and propagat d through binder.
Figure 1.1: TaintDroid architecture within Android.
1.2.2 TaintDroid
TaintDroid is an enhancement built over Android that provides system-wide DIFT.
The TaintDroid architecture within Android is shown in Figur 1.1. Taint tracking
is performed with variab e granula ity al owing for low overhead. A single tag is 32-
bit and sto s 32 distinct 1-bit taint markings. Taint tags re as ociated with files,
parcels, method local variables, method rguments, class fields and arrays. Files and
parcels are associated a singl tag. A limitatio of TaintDroid is that taint tracking
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is not possible inside native methods. Currently TaintDroid only patches the return
taint tag of a native method by considering the taint tags of all its input arguments.
Figure 1.2 shows the modified stack format required for adding taint tag support for
both interpreted targets and native targets.
4
Figure 2 depicts TaintDroid’s architecture. Information
is tainted (1) in a trusted application with sufficient
context (e.g., the location provider). The taint interface
invokes a native method (2) that interfaces with the
Dalvik VM interpreter, storing specified taint markings
in the virtual taint map. The Dalvik VM propagates taint
tags (3) according to data flow rules as the trusted ap-
plication uses the tainted information. Every interpreter
instance simultaneously propagates taint tags. When the
trusted application uses the tainted information in an
IPC transaction, the modified binder library (4) ensures
the parcel has a taint tag reflecting the combined taint
markings of all contained data. The parcel is passed
transparently through the kernel (5) and received by the
remote untrusted application. Note that only the inter-
preted code is untrusted. The modified binder library
retrieves the taint tag from the parcel and assigns it to all
values read from it (6). The remote Dalvik VM instance
propagates taint tags (7) identically for the untrusted
application. When the untrusted application invokes a
library specified as a taint sink (8), e.g., network send,
the library retrieves the taint tag for the data in question
(9) and reports the event.
Implementing this architecture requires addressing
several system challenges, including: a) taint tag storage,
b) interpreted code taint propagation, c) native code taint
propagation, d) IPC taint propagation, and e) secondary
storage taint propagation. The remainder of this section
describes our design and concludes with a discussion of
our integration of TaintDroid with the JIT version of the
Dalvik VM introduced in Android version 2.3.
4.1 Taint Tag Storage
The choice of how to store taint tags influences perfor-
mance and memory overhead. Dynamic taint tracking
systems commonly store tags for every data byte or
word [8], [9]. Tracked memory is unstructured and with-
out content semantics. Frequently taint tags are stored
in non-adjacent shadow memory [9] and tag maps [15].
TaintDroid uses variable semantics within the Dalvik
interpreter. We store taint tags adjacent to variables in
memory, providing spatial locality.
Dalvik has five variable types that require taint stor-
age: method local variables, method arguments, class
static fields, class instance fields, and arrays. In all cases,
we store a 32-bit bitvector with each variable to encode
the taint tag, allowing 32 different taint markings.
Method Local Variables: Temporary variables used for
computation within a method are called “method local
variables” and are the primary use of registers in the
Dalvik interpreter. Registers contain both primitive type
(i.e. scalar) values and object references. Registers are are
always 32 bits. For 64-bit types (e.g., long and double),
Dalvik stores the value in two adjacent 32-bit registers
and manages the registers separately. It is left to the byte-
code instructions to determine if one or two registers
are used for computation. The Dalvik interpreter uses
out1 taint tag
(unused)
VM goop
v0 == local0
v0 taint tag
v1 == local1
v1 taint tag
v2 == in0
Low Addresses (0x00000000)
High Addresses (0xffffffff)
out0
VM goop
v0 == local0
v0 taint tag
v1 == in0
 frame pointer (previous)
frame pointer (current) 
Interpreted Targets
arg0
Native Targets
stack pointer (top) 
out1
out0 taint tag
out0
v1 taint tag
v2 == in1
v2 taint tag
arg1
return taint
arg0 taint tag
arg1 taint tag
v4 taint tag
 variable
 variable taint tag
Fig. 3. Modified Stack Format. Taint tags are interleaved
between registers for interpreted method targets and ap-
pended for native method arguments. Dark grayed boxes
represent taint tags.
a stack to manage the registers. On method invocation,
Dalvik pushes a new stack frame, allocating space for
its registers. During execution, registers are referenced
by an index offset from the current frame pointer. For
example, register v0 is fp[0], register v1 is fp[1], and so
on. On method termination, the stack frame is popped,
losing the register values.
TaintDroid stores 32-bit taint tags for each register (re-
gardless of its current taint state) by allocating room for
double the number of registers during the stack frame
push. Taint tags are stored immediately after registers for
efficient reference (as depicted in Figure 3). TaintDroid
accounts for tag storage by adjusting the frame pointer
index for each register vi to fp[2 · i] (a left bit shift), with
the corresponding taint tag in fp[2 · i+ 1]. Note that for
64-bit scalars allocated as two adjacent 32-bit registers,
the taint tag is duplicated and stored after each register
for consistency with the Dalvik design.
Method Arguments: Dalvik uses registers to pass ar-
gument values to methods. A target method can be
either interpreted or native. Before a method is invoked,
temporary copies of the specified argument registers are
pushed onto the stack. If the target method is inter-
preted, the new values become high numbered local
variable registers in the callee stack frame. If the target
method is native, a pointer to the stack top is passed to
the native method. The target native method is passed a
pointer to a byte array from which it must parse 32 and
64-bit values in using its method signature.
This difference in handling method arguments impacts
taint tag storage, as shown in Figure 3. Arguments for
interpreted methods have interleaved taint tags for con-
sistency with local variable taint storage. Native meth-
ods, on the other hand, expect a specific format in the
received byte array of arguments, and interleaving taint
Figure 1.2: TaintDroid modified stack format.
9
Chapter 2
SpanDex: Secure Password
Tracking for Android
2.1 Introduction
Today’s consumer mobile platforms such as Android and iOS manage large ecosys-
tems of untrusted third-party applications called “apps.” Apps are often integrated
with remote services such as Facebook and Twitter, and it is common for an app
to request one or more passwords upon installation. Given the critical and ubiq-
uitous role that passwords play in linking mobile apps to cloud-based platforms, it
is paramount that mobile operating systems prevent apps from leaking users’ pass-
words. Unfortunately, users have no insight into how their passwords are used, even
as credential-stealing mobile apps grow in number and sophistication [3–5].
Taint tracking is an obvious starting point for securing passwords [6]. Under taint
tracking, a monitor maintains a label for each storage object. As a process executes,
the monitor dynamically updates objects’ labels to indicate which parts of the system
state hold secret information. Taint tracking has been extensively studied for many
decades and has practical appeal because it can be transparently implemented below
existing interfaces [6–9].
Most taint-tracking monitors handle only explicit flows, which directly transfer
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secret information from an operation’s source operands to its destination operands.
However, programs also contain implicit flows, which transfer secret information to
objects via a program’s control flow. Implicit flows are a long-standing problem [1]
that, if left untracked, can dangerously understate which objects contain secret infor-
mation. On the other hand, existing techniques for securely tracking implicit flows
are prone to significantly overstating which objects contain secret information.
Consider secret-holding integer variable s and pseudo-code if s != 0 then x :“ a
else y :“ b done. This code contains explicit flows from a to x and from b to y as
well as implicit flows from s to x and s to y. A secure monitor must account for
the information that flows from s to x and s to y, regardless of which branch the
program takes: y’s value will depend on s even when s is non-zero, and x’s value will
depend on s even when s is zero.
Existing approaches to tracking implicit flows apply static analysis to all un-
taken execution paths within the scope of a tainted conditional branch. The goal
of this analysis is to identify all objects whose values are influenced by the condi-
tion. Strong security requires such analysis to be applied conservatively, which can
lead to prohibitively high false-positive rates due to variable aliasing and context
sensitivity [9, 10].
In this paper, we describe a set of extensions to Android’s Dalvik virtual machine
(VM) called SpanDex that provides strong security guarantees for third-party apps’
handling of passwords. The key to our approach is focusing on the common access
patterns and semantics of the data type we are trying to protect (i.e., passwords).
SpanDex handles implicit flows by borrowing techniques from symbolic execution
to precisely quantify the amount of information a process’ control flow reveals about
a secret. Underlying this approach is the observation that as long as implicit flows
transfer a safe amount of information about a secret, the monitor need not worry
about where this information is stored. For example, mobile apps commonly branch
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on a user’s password to check that it contains a valid mix of characters. As long as
the implicit flows caused by these operations reveal only that the password is well
formatted, the monitor does not need to update any object labels to indicate which
variables’ values depend on this information.
To quantify implicit flows at runtime without sacrificing performance, SpanDex
executes untrusted code in a data-flow defined sandbox. The key property of the
sandbox is that it uses data-flow information to restrict how untrusted code oper-
ates on secret data. In particular, SpanDex is the first system to use constraint-
satisfaction problems (CSPs) at runtime to naturally prevent programs from certain
classes of behavior. For example, SpanDex does not allow untrusted code to en-
crypt secret data using its own cryptographic implementations. Instead, SpanDex’s
sandbox forces apps that require cryptography to call into a trusted library.
SpanDex does not “solve” the general problem of implicit flows. If the amount of
secret information revealed through a process’ control flow exceeds a safe threshold,
then a monitor must either fall back on conservative static analysis for updating
individual labels or simply assume that all subsequent process outputs reveal con-
fidential information. However, we believe that the techniques underlying SpanDex
may be applicable to important data types besides passwords, including credit card
numbers and social security numbers. Experiments with a prototype implementa-
tion demonstrate that SpanDex is a practical approach to securing passwords. Our
experiments show that SpanDex generates far fewer false alarms than the current
state of the art, protects user passwords from a strong attacker, and is efficient.
This paper makes the following contributions:
• SpanDex is the first runtime to securely track password data on unmodified
apps at runtime without overtainting or poor performance.
• SpanDex is the first runtime to use online CSP-solving to force untrusted code
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to invoke trusted libraries when performing certain classes of computation on
secret data.
• Experiments with a SpanDex prototype show that it imposes negligible perfor-
mance overhead, and a study of 50 popular, non-malicious unmodified Android
apps found that all but eight executed normally.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2.2 describes background
information and our motivation, Section 2.3 provides an overview of SpanDex’s de-
sign, Section 2.4 describes SpanDex’s design in detail, Section 2.5 describes our
SpanDex prototype, Section 2.6 describes our evaluation, and Section 2.7 provides
our conclusions.
2.2 Background and Motivation
Under dynamic information-flow tracking (i.e., taint tracking), a monitor maintains
a label for each storage object capable of holding secret information. A label indicates
what kind of secret information its associated object contains. Labels are typically
represented as an array of one-bit tags. Each tag is associated with a different source
of secret data. A tag is set if its object’s value depends on data from the tag’s
associated source. Operations change objects’ state by transferring information from
one set of objects to another. Monitors propagate tags by interposing on operations
that could transfer secret information, and then updating objects’ labels to reflect
any data dependencies caused by an operation. We say that information derived
from a secret is safe if it reveals so little about the original secret that releasing the
information poses no threat. However, if information is unsafe, then it should only
be released to a trusted entity.
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2.2.1 Related Work: Soundness, Precision, and Efficiency
The three most important considerations for taint tracking are soundness, precision,
and efficiency. Tracking is sound if it can identify all process outputs that contain an
unsafe amount of secret information. Soundness is necessary for security guarantees,
such as preventing unauthorized accesses of secret information. Tracking is precise
if it can identify how much secret information a process output contains. Precision
can be tuned along two dimensions: better storage precision associates labels with
finer-grained objects, and better tag precision associates finer-grained data sources
with each tag.
Imprecise tracking leads to overtainting, in which safe outputs are treated as if
they are unsafe. A common way to compensate for imprecise tracking is to require
users or developers to declassify tainted outputs by explicitly clearing objects’ tags.
Tracking is efficient if propagating tags slows operations by a reasonable amount.
The relationship between efficiency and precision is straightforward: increasing stor-
age precision causes a monitor to propagate tags more frequently because it must
interpose on lower-level operations; increasing tag precision causes a monitor to do
more work each time it propagates tags. Finding a suitable balance of soundness,
precision, and efficiency is challenging, and prior work has investigated a variety of
points in the design space.
One approach to information-flow tracking is to use static analysis in combination
with a secrecy-aware type system and programmer-defined declassifiers to prevent
illegal flows [11]. This approach is sound, precise, and efficient but is not compat-
ible with legacy apps. Integrating secrecy annotations and declassifiers into apps
and platform libraries requires a non-trivial re-engineering effort by developers and
platform maintainers.
An alternative way to ensure soundness is to propagate tags on high-level oper-
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ations that generate only explicit flows. An explicit flow occurs when an operation
directly transfers information from from a set of well-defined source objects to a set
of well-defined destination objects [1]. For example, process-level monitors such as
Asbestos [12], Flume [13], and HiStar [14] maintain labels for each address space and
kernel-managed communication channel (e.g., file or socket), and propagate tags for
each authorized invocation of the system API.
Such process-grained tracking is sound and efficient, but operations defined by
a system API commonly manipulate fine-grained objects, such as byte ranges of
memory. The mismatch between the granularity of labeled objects and operation
arguments leads to imprecision. For example, once a process-grained monitor sets
a tag for an address space’s label, it conservatively assumes that any subsequent
operation that copies data out of the address space is unsafe, even if the operation
discloses no secret information.
As with language-based flow monitors, process-grained monitors must rely on
trusted declassifiers to compensate for this imprecision. These declassifiers proxy all
inter-object information transfers and are authorized to clear tags from labels under
their control. However, because declassifiers make decisions with limited context,
they can be difficult to write and require developers to modify existing apps.
Other monitoring schemes have improved precision by associating labels with
finer-grained objects such as individual bytes of memory [7, 8]. While tracking at
too fine a granularity leads to prohibitively poor performance [7, 8] (e.g., 10x to
30x slowdown), propagating tags for individual variables within a high-level lan-
guage runtime is efficient [6]. The primary challenge for such fine-grained tracking
is balancing soundness and precision in the presence of implicit flows.
As before, consider secret-holding variable s and pseudo-code if s != 0 then
x :“ a else y :“ b done. Borrowing terminology from [15], we say that all op-
erations between then and done represent the enclosed region of the conditional
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branch. Thus, the enclosed region contains explicit flows from a to x and from b to
y. Operations like conditional branches induce implicit flows by transferring infor-
mation from the objects used to evaluate a condition to any object whose value is
influenced by an execution path through the enclosed region. We refer to the set of
influenced objects as the enclosed set. The enclosed set includes all objects that are
modified along the taken execution path as well as all objects that might have been
modified along any untaken paths. To ensure soundness, a monitor must propagate
s’s tags to all objects in the enclosed set.
Propagating tags to members of the enclosed set can lead to overtainting in
two ways. First, because a conditional branch does not specify its enclosed set,
the membership must be computed through a combination of static and dynamic
analysis [8, 15]. In our example, a simple static analysis of the program’s control-flow
graph could identify the complete enclosed set consisting of x and y. However, strong
soundness guarantees require an overly conservative analysis of far more complex
untaken paths containing context-sensitive operations and aliased variables. This can
overstate which objects’ values are actually influenced by a branch. Less conservative
tag propagation creates opportunities for malicious code to leak secret information.
Second and more important, the amount of information transferred through a
process’ control flow is often very low. These information-poor flows expose the
problem with tag imprecision. In particular, conventional monitors can only account
for an implicit flow by propagating single-bit tags from the branch condition to mem-
bers of the enclosed set. And yet members of the enclosed set can only reflect as
much new information as the branch condition reveals. When the condition reveals
very little information (e.g., s != 0), a single-bit tag cannot be used to differenti-
ate between an object whose value is weakly dependent on secret information and
one whose value encodes the entire secret. Thus, when an execution’s control flow
transfers very little information, propagating tags to members of the enclosed set
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significantly overstates how much secret information the branch transfers to the rest
of the program state.
Prior work on DTA++[9] and Flowcheck [15] have articulated similar insights
about the causes of overtainting. DTA++ propagates tags to an enclosed set only
if an execution’s control flow reveals the entire secret (i.e., the execution path is
injective with respect to a secret input). However, DTA++ relies on offline symbolic
execution of several representative inputs to select which branches should propagate
tags to their enclosed sets. Offline symbolic execution provides limited code cov-
erage for moderately complex programs and is unlikely to deter actively malicious
programs.
Flowcheck focuses on the imprecision of single-bit taint tags and precisely quan-
tifies the total amount of secret information an execution reveals (as measured in
bits). However, Flowcheck imposes significant performance penalties and must com-
pute the enclosed set (often with assistance from the programmer) to quantify the
channel capacity of enclosed regions.
To summarize, we are unaware of any prior work on information-flow tracking
that provides a combination of soundness, precision, and efficiency that would be
suitable for tracking passwords on today’s mobile platforms.
2.2.2 Android-app Study
To test our hypothesis that conventional handling of implicit flows leads to over-
tainting and false alarms, we created a modified version of TaintDroid [6] called
TaintDroid++ that supports limited implicit-flow tracking. TaintDroid and Taint-
Droid++ track explicit flows the same way. Each variable in a Dalvik executable is
assigned a label consisting of multiple tags, and tags are propagated according to a
standard tag-propagation logic.
The primary difference between the two monitors is that TaintDroid ignores
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implicit flows and TaintDroid++ does not. First, for a Dalvik executable, Taint-
Droid++ constructs a control-flow graph and identifies the immediate post-dominator
(ipd) for each control-flow operation. It then uses smali [16] to insert custom Dalvik
instructions that annotate (1) each ipd with a unique identifier, and (2) each control-
flow operation with the identifier of its ipd. Like Dytan [8], TaintDroid++ does not
propagate tags to objects that might have been updated along untaken execution
paths.
Using these two execution environments, we ran four popular Android apps that
require a user to enter a password: the official apps for LinkedIn, Twitter, Tumblr,
and Instagram. Both systems tagged password data as it was input but before it
was returned to an app. We then manually exercised each app’s functionality and
monitored its network and file outputs for tainted data.
Figure 2.1 shows the number and type of tainted outputs we observed for apps
running under TaintDroid and TaintDroid++. For each tainted output, we manu-
ally inspected the content to determine whether it contained password data or not.
Each tainted output under TaintDroid appeared to be an authentication message
that clearly contained a password. TaintDroid++ also tainted these outputs, but
generated many more tainted network and file writes. We were unable to detect any
password information in these extra tainted outputs, and regard them as evidence
of overtainting.
Overtainting is only a problem if incorrectly tainted data is copied to an inap-
propriate sink. Thus, a false positive occurs when an app copies data that is safe
but tainted to an inappropriate sink. Apps authenticate using the OAuth protocol
and should not store a local copy of a password once they receive an OAuth token
from a server. Thus, each tainted file write generated under TaintDroid++ is a false
positive.
For network writes, we also consider whether the password data was sent over
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Figure 2.1: Tainted outputs for apps running under TaintDroid and Taint-
Droid++.
an encrypted connection (i.e., over SSL) and the IP address of the remote server.
Both Tumblr and Instagram under TaintDroid++ generated unencrypted tainted
network writes. None of these writes were tainted under TaintDroid. Furthermore,
TaintDroid only taints outputs to appropriate servers, but under TaintDroid++
several overtainted outputs were sent to third-parties such as the cloudfront.net CDN
and flurry.com analytics servers. These results are consistent with previous work on
overtainting [17, 18], and confirm that securing users’ passwords requires a better
balance of soundness and precision.
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2.3 System Overview
This section provides an overview of SpanDex, including the principles and attacker
model that inform its design.
2.3.1 Principles
SpanDex’s primary goal is to soundly and precisely track how information about
a password circulates through a mobile app. For example, if an app requests a
Facebook password, then SpanDex should raise an alert only if the app tries to
send an unsafe amount of information about the password to a non-Facebook server.
Preventing leaks also requires a way for users to securely enter and categorize their
passwords, and to address these issues we rely on secure password-entry systems such
as ScreenPass [19]. SpanDex is focused on tracking information after a password has
been securely input and handed over to an untrusted app. The following design
principles guided our work.
Monitor explicit and implicit flows differently. In practice, explicit and im-
plicit flows affect a program’s state in very different ways. Operations on secret data
that trigger explicit flows, transfer a relatively large amount of secret information
to a small number of objects. The inverse is true of control-flow operations that
depend on secret data. These operations often transfer very little secret information
to members of a large enclosed set. These observations led us to apply different
mechanisms to tracking explicit and implicit flows.
First, SpanDex uses conventional taint tracking to monitor explicit flows. Span-
Dex is integrated with TaintDroid and Android’s Dalvik VM, and maintains a label
for each program variable. Each label logically consists of a single-bit tag indicating
whether the variable contains an unsafe amount of information about a character
within a user’s password. Because explicit flows transfer a relatively large amount
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of information between objects, when an object’s tag is set, SpanDex assumes that
the variable contains an unsafe amount of secret information.
Second, when SpanDex encounters a branch with a tainted condition, it does not
immediately propagate tags to objects in the enclosed set. Rather, SpanDex first
updates an upper bound on the total amount of secret information the execution’s
control flow has revealed to that point. This upper bound precisely captures the
maximum amount of secret information that an attacker could encode in untagged
objects. As long as the total amount of secret information transferred through im-
plicit flows is safe, SpanDex can ignore where that information is stored.
Like DTA++, SpanDex borrows techniques from symbolic execution to quantify
the amount of information revealed through implicit flows. In particular, SpanDex
integrates operation logging with tag propagation to record the chain of operations
leading from a tainted variable’s current state back to the original secret input. When
SpanDex encounters a tainted conditional branch, it updates its information bounds
by using these records to solve a constraint-satisfaction problem (CSP). The CSP
solution identifies a set of secret inputs that could have led to the observed execution
path. This set precisely captures the amount of information transferred through
implicit flows.
The drawback of applying these techniques at runtime is the potential for poor
performance. A monitor can efficiently record operations on tainted data at run-
time, but solving a CSP when encountering a tainted branch could be disastrous. In
the worst case, trying to solve a CSP could cause a non-malicious app to halt. For
example, passwords must be encrypted before they are sent over the network, but it
is infeasible to compute the set of all plaintext inputs that could have generated an
encrypted output. Balancing the need to track implicit flows while preventing com-
mon primitives such as cryptography from slowing, or even halting, non-malicious
apps led to our second design principle.
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If commonly used functionality makes tracking difficult, force apps to use
a trusted implementation. Mobile apps typically receive a password, perform san-
ity checks on the characters, encode the password as an http-request string, encrypt
the http-request, and forward the encrypted string to a server. The code used to
transform password data from one representation to another (e.g., encoding a char-
acter array as an http-request string and then encrypting the string) is problematic
because it uses a number of operations that make quantifying implicit flows pro-
hibitively slow or even impossible. This code includes a large number of bit-wise and
array-indexing operations interleaved with tainted conditional branches. If SpanDex
tracked implicit flows within this code as we have described thus far, non-malicious
apps would become unusable.
Fortunately, it is exceedingly rare for apps to implement this functionality them-
selves. Instead, apps rely on platform libraries for common transformations, such as
character encoding and cryptography. On Android this library code is small in size,
easy to understand, and protected by the Java type system.
Tracking explicit flows remains the same for trusted libraries as for untrusted
app code. However, within a trusted library, SpanDex does not solve CSPs when
encountering a tainted branch and may directly update the information bound of a
secret before exiting. This approach is sound for library code whose state is strongly
encapsulated and whose semantics are well understood.
For example, encrypting a tainted string involves a sequence of calls into a crypto
library for initializing the algorithm’s state, updating that state, and retrieving the
final encrypted result. Ignoring tainted conditional branches within this code is
sound for two reasons. First, tracking explicit flows within the library ensures that
any intermediate outputs as well as the final output are properly tagged. Second,
external code can only access library state through the narrow interface defined by
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the library API; there is no way for untrusted code to infer properties about the
plaintext except those that the library explicitly exposes through its interface or by
branching on the plaintext data itself. SpanDex tracks both cases.
The protection boundary separating untrusted code from trusted library code has
two novel properties. First, the boundary is defined by both data flow and control
flow. An app is allowed to use a custom cryptographic implementation on untainted
data, but must use the trusted crypto library to encrypt tainted data. Second,
the boundary is enforced by the aggregate complexity of the operations performed
rather than by hardware or a conventional software guard. If an app attempts to
encrypt password data using a custom implementation or branches on encrypted
data returned by the trusted library, it will be forced to solve an intractable CSP
and halt.
Thus, the key property of a SpanDex’s sandbox is that it restricts the classes of
computation that untrusted code may directly perform on secret data. Instead, an
app must yield control to the trusted platform so that these computations can be
performed on its behalf.
Given an execution environment that can efficiently quantify the amount of secret
information transferred through implicit flows, SpanDex’s final challenge is determin-
ing whether the quantified amount is safe to release. This challenge led to our final
design principle.
Use properties of a secret’s data type to set release policies. Like SpanDex,
DTA++ requires a threshold on the amount of information revealed through implicit
flows. DTA++ applies a strict policy to determine when to propagate tags by doing
so only when the control flow is injective. That is, DTA++ propagates tags when a
single secret value could have led to a particular execution path.
Though simple, this policy is inappropriate for SpanDex. Revealing an entire
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secret value via implicit flows is clearly unsafe, but revealing partial information
about a password may be too. For example, using carefully crafted branches, malware
could cause significant harm by narrowing every character of a password to two
possible values. However, as we have seen, treating all implicit flows as unsafe
leads to prohibitive overtainting. SpanDex’s challenge is to support practical release
policies that sit between these two extremes.
SpanDex benefits from its focus on passwords. Passwords have a well-defined rep-
resentation and fairly well understood attacker model. For example, it is reasonable
to assume that an attacker knows that a password consists of a sequence of human-
readable characters (i.e., ASCII characters 32 through 126), many of which are likely
to be alphanumeric. An attacker gains no new information from observing the con-
trol flow of a process if the flow reveals that each character is within the expected
range of values. We investigate what apps’ control flows reveal in Section 2.6.
2.3.2 Trust and Attacker Model
SpanDex is implemented below the Dalvik VM interface (i.e., the Dex bytecode ISA),
and the protections provided by this VM provide the foundation for SpanDex’s trust
model. Most Android app logic is written in Java and compiled into Dex bytecodes,
which run in an isolated Dalvik VM instance. SpanDex cannot protect passwords
from an app that executes third-party native code while there is password data in its
address space. Thus, objects tainted with password data must be cleared before an
app is allowed to execute its own native code. In addition, once a process invokes
third-party native code, it may not receive password data. SpanDex must rely on
the kernel to maintain information about which processes have invoked third-party
native code. Finally, apps may not write tainted data to persistent storage or send
it to another app via IPC.
SpanDex is focused on securely tracking how password data flows within an app.
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Attacks on other aspects of password handling are outside the scope of our design.
First, we assume that users can securely enter their password before it is given to
an app, and that users will tag a password with its associated domain. A secure,
unspoofable user interface, such as the one provided by ScreenPass [19], can provide
such guarantees. Special purpose hardware, such as Apple’s Touch ID fingerprint
sensor and secure enclave [20], could also provide this guarantee.
Second, SpanDex can help ensure that password data is shared only with servers
within the domain specified by the user, but provides no guarantees once it leaves
a device. For example, SpanDex cannot prevent an attacker from sending a user’s
Facebook password as a message to a Facebook account controlled by the attacker.
Preventing such cases requires cooperation between SpanDex and the remote server.
SpanDex could notify the service when a message contains password data, and the
service could determine whether such messages should contain password data.
We assume that an attacker completely controls one or more apps that a user has
installed, and that the attacker is also in control of one or more remote servers. The
attacker’s servers can communicate with the attacker’s apps, but the servers reside in
a different domain than the one the user associates with her password. The attacker
can make calls into the platform libraries and manipulate its apps’ data and control
flows to send information about passwords to its remote servers.
Based on the large-scale leakage of large password lists from major services, such
as Gawker [21] and Sony Playstation [22], we assume that an attacker has access to a
large list of unique passwords, and that the user’s password is on the list. However,
we assume that the attacker does not know which usernames are associated with
each entry in the list (though it does know the user’s username).
Thus, our attacker’s goal is to de-anonymize the user within its password list
using information gathered from its apps. The attacker can send its servers as much
untainted data describing a user’s password as SpanDex’s release policies allow (i.e.,
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the password length as well as a range of possible values for each password character).
In the worst case, the attacker will eliminate all but one of the passwords in its list.
On the other hand, if the app provides no new information, then the user’s password
could be any of the ones in the list.
Once the attacker has computed the set of possible passwords for a username, it
can only identify the correct username-password combination through online query-
ing. For example, if an attacker infers that Bob’s Facebook password is one of ten
possibilities, then the attacker needs at most ten tries to login to Facebook as Bob.
The attacker may also have extra information about the usage distribution of
passwords in its database. For example, the attacker may know that one password
is used by twice as many users as another. While information from the app can
help the attacker narrow a user’s password to a smaller set of possibilities, the usage
distribution allows the attacker to prioritize its login attempts to reduce the expected
number of attempts before a successful login. We return to this issue in Section 2.6.
2.4 SpanDex Design
As with conventional taint tracking, SpanDex updates objects’ labels on each oper-
ation that generates an explicit flow. If the monitor encounters a control-flow opera-
tion with a tainted condition, it does not update the labels of objects in the enclosed
set. Instead, the monitor updates an upper bound on the amount of information the
execution’s control flow has revealed about the secret input.
SpanDex represents this bound as a possibility set (p-set). SpanDex maintains
a p-set for each password character an app receives. P-sets logically contain the
possible values of a character revealed by a process’ control flow. Each time the
app’s control flow changes as a result of tainted objects, SpanDex attempts to remove
values from the secret’s p-set.
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2.4.1 Operation dag
In order to narrow a p-set, SpanDex must understand the data flow from the original
secret values to a tainted condition. We capture these dependencies in an operation
dag (op-dag). This directed acyclic graph provides a record of all taint-propagating
operations that influenced a tainted object’s value as well as the order in which the
operations occurred.
SpanDex reuses TaintDroid’s label-storage strategy, and stores each 32-bit label
adjacent to its object’s value. However, whereas each bit in a TaintDroid label
represents a different category of sensitive data (e.g., location or IMEI), SpanDex
labels are pointers to nodes in the op-dag. If an object’s label is null, then it is
untainted. If an object’s label is non-null, then its value depends on secret data.
Label storage in SpanDex most significantly differs from TaintDroid for arrays.
In TaintDroid, each array is assigned a single label for all entries. If any array
element becomes tainted, then the entire array is treated as tainted. This approach is
inappropriate for SpanDex because we want to track individual password characters.
Thus, SpanDex maintains per-entry labels. However, the reason that TaintDroid
maintains a single label for each array is storage overhead. Byte and character
arrays account for a large percentage of an app’s memory usage, and assigning a
32-bit label for each byte-array entry could lead to a minimum fourfold increase in
memory overhead for array labels.
To avoid this overhead, SpanDex allocates labels for arrays only after they contain
tainted data. Each array is initially allocated a single label. If the array is untainted,
then its label points to null. If the array contains tainted data, then its label points
to a separate label array, with one label for each array entry. As with local-variable
and object-field labels, array-element labels point to nodes in the op-dag. Since very
few arrays contain password data, the overhead of maintaining per-entry labels is
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low overall.
The roots of the op-dag are special nodes that contain the original value of each
secret (i.e., each password character), a pointer to the secret’s p-set, and domain
information. A p-set is represented as a doubly-linked list of value ranges. Each
entry in the list contains a pointer to the previous and next entries, as well as a
minimum and maximum value. Ranges are inclusive, and the union of the ranges
specifies the set of possible secret values revealed by an app’s control flow. SpanDex
initializes p-sets to the range r32, 126s to represent all printable ASCII characters. A
secret’s domain can be specified by the user through a special software keyboard [19].
Each tainted object version has an associated non-root node that records the
operation that created the version, including its source operands. Source operands
can be stored as concrete values (when operands are untainted) or as pointers to
other nodes in the op-dag (when operands are tainted).
A node can point to more than one node, and there may be multiple paths from
a node to one or more roots. The more complex the paths from a node to the op-dag
roots are, the more complex updating p-sets becomes.
2.4.2 Example Execution
If a tainted variable influences an app’s control flow (e.g., via a conditional branch),
then SpanDex traverses the op-dag from the node pointed to by the object’s label
toward the roots. To demonstrate how SpanDex maintains and uses op-dags and p-
sets, consider the simple snippet of pseduo-code below. Figure 2.2 shows the resulting
op-dag and p-set.
0000: mov v1, v0 // v0, v1 label=ROOT
0002: add v2, v1, 3 // v2’s label=N1
0004: add v2, v2, 2 // v2’s label=N2
0006: sub v3, 6, v2 // v3’s label=N3
0008: add v2, v2, 7 // v2’s label=N4
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Figure 2.2: Simple op-dag and p-set example.
000a: const/16 v4, 122 // v4’s label=0
000c: if-le v3, v4, 0016
000e: ...
The first character of the password is ‘p’, or numeric value 112, and is stored in
register v0. The password’s domain is Facebook. v0’s label points to the Root node
for the secret character. v0 is then copied into v1, whose label must also point to
Root. The sum of v1 and 3 is then stored in v2, whose label then points to new
node, N1. N1 contains the addition operation, the 3 operand, and points to Root.
The next line adds 2 to v2. This creates a new version of v2, which is recorded in
N2. N2 contains the 2 operand and points to the node for the previous version of v2,
node N1. The remaining arithmetic operations proceed similarly. Finally, the code
loads the constant value of 122 into v4 for an upcoming conditional branch. v4’s
label is null, since it is not tainted.
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When the code reaches the conditional branch, v3 is less than or equal to v4,
since v3’s value is 111, and v4’s value is 122. Because v3’s label is non-null, SpanDex
uses the op-dag node in v3’s label (N3) to update the p-set.
Updating the p-set is equivalent to solving a CSP to determine which secret values
could have led to the control-flow change. In our example, updating the p-set is easy.
SpanDex solves the inequality v0` 6´ 2´ 3 ď 122, leading to v0 ď 121. Thus, the
control flow reveals that the first character of the user’s password is within the range
of r32, 121s. SpanDex updates the p-set to reflect this before resuming execution.
Figure 2.2 shows the state of the op-dag and p-set at this point.
This simple example demonstrates some of the challenges and nuances of Span-
Dex’s approach. First, each node in the op-dag represents a version of a tainted
variable. N3 points to the version of v2 used to update v3, so that when SpanDex
reaches the conditional branch, it can retrieve the sequence of operations that led to
v3’s current value.
Second, reversible operations such as addition and subtraction make updating
p-sets straightforward. Unfortunately, Dalvik supports a number of instructions
that are much trickier to handle. For example, Dalvik supports instructions for
operating on Java Object references and arrays that behave very differently than
simple arithmetic operations. Even some classes of arithmetic operations, such as
bit-wise operators and division, can make solving a CSP non-trivial.
Third, there was a single path from N3 to Root in our example. If N3 had forked
due to multiple tainted operands, or had led to multiple root nodes due to mixing
secret characters, solving the CSP would have been far more complex. Compression
and cryptography often mix information from multiple characters, which creates a
complex nest of paths from nodes to the op-dag roots.
Fortunately, among the popular non-malicious apps that we have studied, difficult-
to-handle operations occur only in platform code such as the Android cryptography
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library. Furthermore, it is rare to find apps that branch on the results of these opera-
tions outside of platform code. Thus, as long as SpanDex can ensure that all outputs
from these libraries are explicit and tainted, then we can ignore implicit flows within
them (and thus, avoid CSP solving).
This approach is intuitive. First, outside of simple sanity checking on a pass-
word, there is little reason for an app to operate on password data itself. Second,
libraries such as a crypto library are designed to suppress implicit flows. Observing
an encrypted output or a cryptographic hash should not reveal anything about the
plaintext input. Third, there is no obvious reason why app code should branch on ei-
ther encrypted data or a cryptographic hash. Apps simply use the platform libraries
to encode these outputs as strings and send them to a server.
There are many difficult operations that we have not observed in either app code
or library code. Our general approach to these operations is to propagate taint to the
results of these operations, but to fault if they cause the control flow to change. For
example, an app may use bit-wise operations to encode a character, but branching
on the encoded result is not allowed. This is secure and does not disrupt non-
malicious apps. In the next section, we describe how SpanDex treats each class of
Dex bytecodes in greater detail.
2.4.3 Dex Bytecodes
In this section, we describe how SpanDex handles each of the following classes of
bytecodes: type-conversion operations, object operations, control-flow operations,
arithmetic operations, and array operations.
Type conversions. Dalvik supports the following data types: boolean, byte, char,
short, int, long, float, double, and Object reference, as well as arrays of each of
these types. P-set ranges are represented internally as pairs of floats. Solving CSPs
involving conversions to alternate representations is supported as long as the type is
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a native and numeric.
Object Conversions. Dex provides a number of instructions for converting be-
tween data types, but conversions can also occur through Object-method invocations
and arrays. For example, an app could index into an Object array with a tainted
character, where the fields of each Object encodes its position in the array. The
returned Object reference would be tainted, and would identify the character used
to index into the array. The return value of any method used to access a field of the
tainted Object would also be tainted. However, SpanDex would have to understand
the internal semantics of the Object in order to solve a CSP involving the tainted
returned value. Thus, branching on data derived from a tainted Object reference is
not allowed.
Control-flow. A Dalvik program’s control flow can change as a result of secret
data in many ways. Conditional branch operations such as if-eq are the most
straightforward, and SpanDex handles these as described in Section 2.4.2.
Dalvik also supports two case switching operations: packed-switch and sparse-
-switch. Both instructions take an index and a reference to a jump table as argu-
ments. The difference between the instructions is the format of the jump table and
how it is used. The table for a packed-switch is a list of key-target pairs, in which
the keys are consecutive integers. Dalvik first checks to see if the index is within the
table’s range of consecutive keys. If it is not, then the code does not branch and
execution resumes at the instruction following the switch instruction. If it is in the
table, then the code computes the new PC by adding the matching target to the
current PC.
The table for a sparse-switch is also a list of key-target pairs, but the keys do
not have to be consecutive integers (though they have to be sorted from low-to-high).
To handle this instruction, the VM checks whether the index is greater than zero and
less than or equal to the table size. It then uses the index to perform a binary search
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on the keys to find a match. If it finds a match, then it jumps to the instruction at
the sum of the matching target and current PC.
Although more complex than conditional branches, handling these switch instruc-
tions is straightforward. If the code falls through the switch instruction, then the
resulting implicit flow reveals that the index is not equal to any of the table keys.
SpanDex can solve a CSP for each of the keys and update its p-sets accordingly. If
the control-flow is diverted by the switch instruction, then the resulting implicit flow
reveals that the index is equal to the matching table key. SpanDex can solve a CSP
for this condition as well. In practice, most switch instructions are packed and the
corresponding jump tables are small, which makes solving CSPs for these operations
fast.
Finally, a program’s control flow can be influenced by tainted data if an operation
on tainted data causes an exception to be thrown. For example, an app could divide
a number by a tainted variable with value of a zero, or it could use a tainted variable
to index beyond the length of an array. SpanDex could compute a CSP for the
information revealed by each of these conditions, e.g., that a tainted variable is equal
to zero or that a tainted variable is greater than the length of an array. However,
we have not seen this behavior in any of the apps we have studied. As a result, our
current implementation simply stops the program when an instruction with a tainted
operand causes an exception to be thrown.
Arithmetic. As we saw in Section 2.4.2, reversible arithmetic operations are straight-
forward to handle. Other arithmetic operations are not impossible to handle, but
require a complex solver. For example, reversing multiplication and division oper-
ations is tricky because of rounding. Bit-wise operations are even more difficult to
reason about. Fortunately, it is exceedingly rare for app code to branch on the results
of these operations. Instead, we have observed that trusted library code is far more
likely to branch on the results of these operations. As long as we can ensure that
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all library outputs are explicit, then we do not need to solve CSPs involving difficult
operations when in trusted code.
Arrays. Dex provides instructions for inserting (iput) and retrieving (iget) data
from an array. Due to type-conversion problems, SpanDex does not allow tainted
indexing of non-numeric arrays. In particular, an app may not use a tainted variable
to index into an Object array.
Handling an iget operation requires keeping a checkpoint of the array in the
op-dag node for the variable holding the result. For example, say that all of the
entries in an int array are zero or one, and that an app indexes into the array with
a tainted variable. The returned value would be stored in a tainted variable. If the
app later branched on the tainted variable, then SpanDex must look at the array
checkpoint to determine which indexes would have returned the same value as the
executed iget. In practice, tainted iget instructions are rare, and when they do
occur the arrays are small.
Unlike a tainted iget, a tainted iput instruction is dangerous. Consider an
attacker that initializes an array a with known size, such that all entries are equal to
zero. It then stores the first password character in the variable s and inserts a one
into arss. Because SpanDex maintains per-entry labels for arrays, arss is tainted, but
no other entries are. The attacker can then incrementally send each value in the array
to its server: only arss is tainted and will be stopped by SpanDex. Unfortunately,
stopping the app at this point is too late, since the number of received zeros reveals
the value of s. As a result of this attack, tainted iput instructions are illegal.
Finally, Dex also provides instructions such as filled-new-array for creating
and populating arrays, and SpanDex disallows tainted operands on these instructions.
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2.4.4 Trusted Libraries
As described above, there are a number of operations on tainted data that would
add significant complexity to SpanDex’s CSP solver to support. Even worse, the
complexity of the op-dags that combinations of these operations would create make
it doubtful that even a sophisticated solver could handle them quickly, if at all.
Ideally, these operations would never arise, and if they did, an app would never
branch on their results. Sadly, this not the case. Many apps require cryptographic
and string-encoding libraries to handle passwords, and these libraries are rife with
difficult to handle operations as well as branching on the results of those operations.
Trying to solve such complex CSPs would make SpanDex unusable: non-malicious
apps would halt just trying to encrypt a password. At the same time, ignoring flows
generated by these operations is not secure. Luckily, we have observed that branching
on the results of difficult operations consistently occurs within a handful of simple
platform libraries.
Thus, SpanDex’s approach to handling difficult implicit flows is to identify the
functionality that creates them in advance and to isolate these flows inside trusted
implementations. As long as the outgoing information flows from these libraries are
always tainted and explicit, SpanDex does not need to worry about their internal
control-flow leaking secret information. Furthermore, this code is open and well
known, is protected by the Java type system, and can be modified to eliminate
implicit flows through the library API.
The set of libraries that SpanDex trusts not to leak information implicitly is
shown in Listing 2.1.
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java.lang.String (selected methods excluded)
java.lang.Character
java.lang.Math
java.lang.IntegralToString
java.lang.RealToString
java.lang.AbstractStringBuilder
java.net.URLEncoder
java.util.HashMap
android.os.Bundle
android.os.Parcel
org.bouncycastle.crypto
Listing 2.1: Set of libraries trusted by SpanDex to not leak information implicitly.
Nearly all of this code is either stateless string encoding and decoding, or cryp-
tography.
2.4.5 Various Attacks and Counter-measures
We described several attacks in Section 2.3.2 that are beyond the scope of SpanDex.
In this section, we describe several other attacks and how SpanDex might handle
them.
First, SpanDex does not allow tainted data to be written to the file system or
copied to another process via IPC. This is reasonable because mobile apps should
only require a user’s password to retrieve an OAuth token from a remote server.
After receiving the token, the app should discard the user’s password. If an app tries
to copy tainted data to an external server, then SpanDex must consult the domains
in the set of reachable op-dag root nodes.
Second, an attacker could have multiple apps under its control generate multiple
overlapping (but not identical) p-sets. Each individual p-set would appear safe,
but when combined at the attacker’s server, they could collectively reveal an unsafe
amount of information. Relatedly, a malicious app could request a user’s password
multiple times and compute different ranges on each password copy.
One way to detect this class of attacks is by inspecting the membership of a
secret’s p-sets. For the apps that we have observed, p-sets usually correspond to
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natural character groupings, e.g., numbers, lower-case letters, upper-case letters,
and related special characters. P-sets containing unusual character groupings could
be a strong signal that an app is malicious.
The solution to this attack suggests a larger class of counter-measures that use
information from the p-sets and op-dag to detect malicious behavior. For example,
anomalous operation mixes or an unusually large op-dag could indicate an attack.
One of the advantages of SpanDex is that it gives the monitor a great deal of insight
into how an app operates on password data. We believe that this information could
enable a rich universe of policies, though enumerating all of them is beyond the scope
of this paper.
Finally, it is possible that SpanDex is vulnerable to certain classes of side-channel
and timing attacks that we have not considered. However, any attack that relies
on branching on tainted data would be detected. For example, consider the well-
known attack on Tenex’s password checker [23]. Even though the attack uses a page-
fault side channel that is out of SpanDex’s scope, SpanDex would have prevented it
because each additional character comparison would have narrowed its p-set to an
unsafe level.
2.5 Implementation
Our SpanDex prototype is built on top of TaintDroid for Android 2.3.4. We modified
TaintDroid to support p-sets and op-dags, and made several modification to the
Android support libraries. Most of our changes to these libraries were made in
java.lang.String.
First, public String methods whose return value could reveal something about a
tainted string’s value are not considered trusted to ensure that p-sets are updated
properly (e.g., equals(Object), compareTo(String)).
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Second, as a performance optimization, the Dalvik VM replaces calls to certain
performance-critical Java methods with inlined “intrinsic” functions that are written
in C and built in to the Dalvik VM (e.g., String.equals(Object), String.compare-
To(String)). However, if an intrinsic inlined function operates on a tainted string
and performs comparisons involving the string’s characters, we are unable to update
the p-sets accordingly. To avoid this, we modified Dalvik’s intrinsic inlines that
operate on strings to check if the string is tainted and, if so, invoke the Java version
instead.
Third, Android’s implementation of java.lang.String performs an optimization
when converting an ASCII character to its String value: it uses the character’s
ASCII code to index into a constant char array containing all ASCII characters. If
the character to be converted is tainted, we prevent this optimization from being
used, as it would result in an array lookup with a tainted index.
Finally, we modified the android.widget.TextView and implemented a custom
IME with a special tainted input mode that can be enabled to indicate to SpanDex
when a sequence of characters is sensitive (i.e., a password).
2.6 Evaluation
In order to evaluate SpanDex, we sought answers to the following questions: How well
does SpanDex protect users’ passwords from an attacker? What is the performance
overhead of SpanDex?
2.6.1 Password Protection
As described in Section 2.3.2, we have designed SpanDex based on an attacker that
has access to a large list of cleartext passwords. The attacker knows that a user’s
password is in the list, and uses untainted information from its malicious app to
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narrow a user’s password to a smaller set of possibilities. To understand how well
SpanDex can protect users from such an attack, we need to know the kind of p-
sets that real apps induce, we need access to a large list of cleartext passwords,
and we need a realistic distribution of how passwords are used. All of these pieces
of information will allow us to calculate the number of expected logins an attacker
would need to guess a user’s password, given the amount of untainted password
information that SpanDex allows apps to reveal.
First, we ran 50 popular apps from Google’s Play Store. Each of these apps re-
quired a login, and we used the same 35-character password for each app. The pass-
word contained one lower-case letter (‘a’), one upper-case letter (‘A’), one number
(‘0’), and one of each of the 32 non-space special ASCII characters. 42 ran without
modification1. The top row of Table 2.1 shows each character in the password.
Eight apps invoked native code before requesting a user’s password2. While these
apps would have to be modified to run under SpanDex, waiting to invoke native code
before requesting a user’s password is unlikely to require major changes. All other
apps ran normally.
Table 2.1: Password-character p-set sizes for 42 popular Android apps
! ” # $ % & ’ ( ) * + , - . / 0 : ; ă = ą ? @ A [ \ ] ˆ ‘ a { | } ˜
Max 95 95 95 95 95 95 95 95 95 95 95 95 95 95 95 95 95 95 95 95 95 95 95 95 95 95 95 95 95 95 95 95 95 95 95
75th 90 16 33 90 90 33 33 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 83 92 90 90 33 90 92 90 90 90 90 32 65 90 90 90 95 90 90 90 90
Med 16 12 12 16 16 12 12 16 16 13 16 16 13 13 14 10 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 26 6 6 6 6 6 6 90 4 4 4 4
25th 12 4 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 1 12 12 1 1 12 10 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 26 5 5 5 5 1 5 26 4 4 4 4
Min 1 1 3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3 4 1 1 1 10 1 1 1 1 1 1 3 26 1 1 2 4 1 4 26 1 1 3 4
For the 42 apps that ran unmodified, after their password was sent, we inspected
the p-set for each password character and counted its size. Table 2.1 shows the
1 Audible, Amazon, Amazonmp3, Askfm, Atbat, Badoo, Chase, Crackle, Ebay, Etsy, Evernote,
Facebook, Flipboard, Flixster, Foursquare, Heek, Howaboutwe, Iheartradio, imdb, LinkedIn, My-
fitnesspal, Nflmobile, Pandora, Path, Pinger, Pinterest, Rhapsody, Skout, Snapchat, Soundcloud,
Square, Tagged, Textplus, Tumblr, Tunein, Twitter, Walmart, Wordpress, Yelp, Zillow, Zite, and
Zoosk
2 Dropbox, Hulu+, Kindle, Mint, Skype, Spotify, Starbucks, and Voxer
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maximum, 75th percentile, median, 25th percentile, and minimum p-set size for each
password character. The header of the table shows the password. The first thing to
notice is that the p-sets for the letters in our password (i.e., ‘A’ and ‘a’) were never
smaller than 26. This makes sense, since each app is branching to determine that
the character is either a lower or upper case letter. The same is true for the number
in our password, ‘0’. No numeric p-set was smaller than 10.
The more difficult cases are the non-alphanumeric special characters. For these
cases, the p-sets are fairly app specific. In some cases, the app’s control flow depends
on a specific character (e.g., Skout with several special characters), but most char-
acters’ p-sets remain large across most apps. With the exception of ‘*’, ‘-’, ‘.’, and
‘ ’, all non-alphanumeric characters had large p-sets for 75% of apps or more.
Given this observed app behavior, we next obtained the uniqpass-v11 list of 131-
million unique passwords [24]. The list contains passwords from a number of sources,
including the Sony Pictures [22] and Gawker leaks [21]. To simulate an attack, we
selected a password, p, from the list and computed the p-sets that a typical app
would generate for p. In particular, we assume that the attacker can infer p’s length
and whether each character is a lower-case letter (26 possibilities), an upper-case
letter (26 possibilities), a number (10 possibilities), or a member of a block of special
ASCII characters (i.e., the 16 characters below ‘0’, the 7 characters between ‘9’ and
‘A’, the 6 characters between ‘Z’ and ‘a’, and the 4 characters after ‘z’).
This information gave us a kind of regular expression for p based on the type
of each of its characters. We call the set of passwords matching this expression the
match set and the size of the match set the match count. The larger a password’s
match count, the more uncertain an attacker is about what password the user entered.
We computed the match count for all passwords in the uniqpass list in this way.
Finally, we counted the number of passwords with a given match count to arrive at
the inverse distribution function.
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Figure 2.3: CDFs of expected login attempts using the uniqpass password list.
These calculations show that if SpanDex allows an attacker to learn the p-sets
for a password from a typical app, the attacker will have trouble narrowing the set
of possible passwords for the user. In particular, 92% of passwords have a match
count greater than 10,000, 96% of passwords have a match count greater than 1,000,
98% of passwords have a match count greater than 100, and 99% of passwords have
a match count greater than 10.
Unfortunately, recent work on a variety of password databases suggest that pass-
word usage follows a zipf distribution [25]. Thus, we also model the N passwords in
a match set as a population of N elements that contains exactly one success (as a
user would only have one correct password). Next, we let n be the random variable
denoting the number of tries required to guess the correct password and find Erns,
the expected value of n. If the passwords are all equally probable, we try them in
random order. Otherwise, we try them in the descending order of their probability.
Note that each password try is done without replacement, i.e., after trying i pass-
words, we only consider the remaining pN´ iq passwords when picking the next most
probable password.
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A study of the distribution of passwords publicly leaked from Hotmail, flirtlife.de,
computerbits.ie, and RockYou found that the passwords in each of these sets can be
reasonably modelled by a zipf distribution with s parameter values of 0.246, 0.695,
0.23, and 0.7878 respectively [25]. Using these values of s, we modeled the passwords
in each match set and computed the CDF of Erns.
When s “ 0.7878, 95% of the time, the attacker is likely to guess the correct
password within 50 tries. When the s value for the zipf distribution is 0.246 or less,
99% of passwords are expected to require 10 or more login attempts, and 90% of
passwords are expected to require 80 or more attempts. for all users. Figure 2.3
shows the CDFs for all four s values.
Unfortunately, we do not know the usage distribution for the uniqpass dataset
since it contains only unique passwords.
2.6.2 Performance Overhead
To measure the performance overhead of SpanDex we used the CaffeineMark bench-
mark and compared it to stock Android 2.3.4 and TaintDroid. Both TaintDroid
and SpanDex ran without any tainted data. Since SpanDex only handles password
data that is discarded after an initial login, this is SpanDex’s common case. The
benchmark was run on a Nexus S smartphone. The results are in Figure 2.4.
Overall, SpanDex performs only 16% worse than stock Android and 7% worse
than TaintDroid. Stock Android performs significantly better than either TaintDroid
or SpanDex in the string portion of the benchmark. This is because TaintDroid and
SpanDex both disable some optimized string-processing code to store labels.
Finally, we would like to note that when testing apps in Section 2.6.1, we did not
encounter any noticeable slow down under SpanDex. This was due to login being
dominated by network latency and the simplicity of the CSPs these apps generated.
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2.7 Conclusion
SpanDex tracks implicit flows by quantifying the amount of information transferred
through implicit flows when an app executes a tainted control-flow operation. Using
a strong attacker model in which a user’s password is known to exist in a large
password list, we found that for a realistic password-usage distribution, for 90%
of users an attacker is expected to need 80 or more login attempts to guess their
password.
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Chapter 3
TaintTrap: Native Code Taint
Tracking
3.1 Introduction
Android apps are typically written in Java and compiled to Dalvik Bytecode inter-
preted by the Dalvik Virtual Machine (VM). However, apps can also leverage native
code that executes outside of the VM. For performance or legacy reasons, apps can
provide their own shared libraries within the application package, written in C/C++,
which execute directly as native code. A recent study found that 16% of apps use
native code [27]. Furthermore, starting with Android 4.4, a new experimental An-
droid runtime (ART) [28] aims to replace the default Dalvik runtime, and provides
automatic and transparent ahead-of-time compilation of Dalvik code to native code
for apps. Furthermore with the release of Android 5.0, ART is the default runtime,
leading towards 100% native code execution in apps.
Hence, we believe supporting native code is key to providing complete system-
wide information-flow tracking. Unfortunately there is no existing smartphone track-
ing system that supports native code tracking without significant performance impact
on the device.
TaintDroid [6], the current state of the art Android on-device taint tracking
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system, is only capable of monitoring taint within the Dalvik VM. If the Dalvik
code attempts to execute an app provided native function, TaintDroid is unable
to continue to propagate taint until the native function returns. For this reason,
TaintDroid’s policy is to block all 3rd party apps from loading and invoking packaged
native libraries. Unfortunately, this strong restriction can break any application that
relies on native code, a common occurrence for the popular Android apps which rely
on native code for performance reasons.
Another recent system, NDroid [27], also notes the importance of native code and
extends TaintDroid to support native code interactions. However, it does not run on
a real smartphone limiting its applicability, and relies on QEMU for virtualization,
preventing apps from interacting with real environments (e.g., GPS or camera).
Motivated by ART and limitations of native code taint tracking for mobile de-
vices, our goal is to create a practical taint tracking system that runs on a real
smartphone device and allows apps to freely use native code, while maintaining the
same tracking capabilities of Dalvik code offered by TaintDroid.
The intuition behind this work is based on the observation that apps, while
trusted with sensitive data (e.g. passwords, contacts, GPS, camera), access this data
or perform computations on it either rarely or for brief periods of time during the
entire usage of the app. Using this insight we aim for a smartphone specific hardware-
software approach that is built around the common case: apps rarely touch tainted
data.
The key idea is to only perform the expensive taint tracking in rare cases when
needed, otherwise providing the ability to run with negligible performance overhead.
The purpose of our system is to deliver seamless end-to-end taint tracking across
the Dalvik VM interpreter, platform native libraries and native libraries used by
applications.
The proposed system has the following objectives:
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• Full-system taint tracking on Android, spanning both Dalvik VM and native
ARM code.
• Ability to switch between Unmodified Native Execution and Emulation, only
when strictly needed.
• Low-overhead fine-grained Taint Access Faults by leveraging hardware support.
Section 3.2 provides an overview of the system. Section 3.3 covers the implemen-
tation details of our prototype. We evaluate the system in Section 3.4, review related
work in Section 3.5, and conclude in Section 3.6.
3.2 System Overview
Since continuously instrumenting all native code execution on Android is prohibitively
slow, we envision a flexible hybrid approach between a Dalvik taint tracking system
and a native code tracking system. We extend TaintDroid’s existing VM taint track-
ing with native code taint tracking and allow native code to execute unmodified so
long as it does not access any tainted data. The challenge is knowing when native
code touches tainted data while letting the code run unmodified. The key idea is
that a mechanism for protecting access to tainted memory is sufficient to allow code
to execute unmodified, relying on the protection to interrupt (trap) execution if the
program does access tainted data.
We propose TaintTrap, a taint tracking system where native code tracking is
designed with the ability to switch between unmodified/non-tainted execution and
tainted execution. A key benefit of TaintTrap is Selective Emulation: the ability to
emulate on-demand only the instructions accessing tainted data. This is a significant
benefit in the common case of apps infrequently accessing tainted data (e.g. one-
time password login) as the majority of app’s execution is unaffected by TaintTrap.
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Figure 3.1 provides a high level overview of the native code execution phases in
TaintTrap’s design.
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• Emulate)
• Taint)Track{
Taint)Access)  
Protection
Native)Call)
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Native)Execution 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Native)Execution 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Return
Memory Files
Figure 3.1: TaintTrap overview of on-demand native code taint tracking using
emulation.
In this section, we describe the essential components needed for full-system taint
tracking used by TaintTrap.
3.2.1 Dalvik VM Tainting
The VM interpreter executes Dalvik bytecode and for each bytecode opcode, addi-
tional instrumentation is added for taint propagation logic responsible for updating
shadow memory and for assigning per-file taint tags. This instrumentation is part of
the existing TaintDroid system.
3.2.2 Taint Map
At any given time, TaintTrap is aware of the range of addresses containing tainted
data. This is achieved by keeping track of tainted data movement together with
instrumenting system library functions such as libc’s read and write. The memory
taint map keeps track of tainted data stored in memory. For each word of memory, it
keeps track of its associated 32-bit taint tag. Whenever an instruction that references
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memory is emulated, the taint map is accessed to either check if the memory being
read is tainted or to update the taint tag when memory is written. Separate from
the memory taint map, TaintTrap also keeps track of taint for each architectural
register.
3.2.3 Taint Access Protection
TaintDroid’s tracking loses visibility when apps call into native code. The role of
the TaintTrap’s Taint Access Protection (TAP) layer is to ensure that once control
is transferred from the VM to native code, any memory access to data inside the
Taint Map triggers a Taint Access Protection Fault. Upon a TAP Fault, control is
then transferred to a TAP Handler responsible for preparing the transition to Native
Execution Emulation. To also intercept any access to tainted files on the device and
trigger a TAP Fault, we also need to make transparent changes to the file system
interface.
3.2.4 Native Execution Emulation
In emulation, we execute the application binary with complete (registers, memory
and I/O) taint propagation logic. The taint tracking aware binary can either be
statically instrumented with taint tracking instructions, dynamically in the form of
JIT or taint tracking is emulated. Static instrumentation can be useful if the require-
ment is to instrument the entire binary, while TaintTrap’s approach instruments only
when strictly needed, on-demand depending on the data the program accesses. Thus,
statically instrumenting the binary is not a feasible option, particularly since it re-
quires statically determining which code to instrument and code touching tainted
data could vary at run-time.
To emulate any instruction, TaintTrap requires dynamic disassembly and decod-
ing of assembly instructions. For this task, TaintTrap leverages darm [29], an efficient
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structural disassembler for ARM.
For performance reasons, it is important that TaintTrap spends as little time as
needed performing emulation. The key is determining what conditions are needed
to allow a transition back to unmodified native execution. The insight comes from
observing with a mechanism such as TAP that is able to protect tainted memory
accesses, once architectural registers are no longer tainted, it is safe to switch to
unmodified native execution.
3.2.5 Trust and Attacker Model
TaintTrap’s emulation framework is implemented in user-space and relies on non-
privileged OS features that the application being instrumented has access to. The
operating system (Android platform and Linux kernel) is considered trusted. This
means that TaintTrap can be subverted by a malicious adversary with specific knowl-
edge of the system’s internals. For example, an attacker with knowledge of emulation
state memory layout within the app’s virtual memory, could craft a malicious app
that can change emulation state to disable monitoring or covertly un-taint tainted
data by directly writing memory inside the app’s own address space. However, Taint-
Trap is still useful for monitoring malicious apps that are not intentionally subverting
TaintTrap, although in this case we cannot make any guarantees.
Upon decoding an instruction, darm provides detailed structural information. A
listing of the most commonly used fields is shown in Listing 3.1.
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struct darm_t {
// the original encoded instruction
uint32_t w;
// the instruction label
darm_instr_t instr;
darm_enctype_t instr_type;
// conditional execution flags, if any
darm_cond_t cond;
// flag: conditional flags updated
uint32_t S;
// flag: add or to subtract the immediate
uint32_t U;
// flag: pre-indexed or post-indexed addressing
uint32_t P;
// flag: write-back
uint32_t W;
// flag: immediate set
uint32_t I;
// rotation value
uint32_t rotate;
// register operands
// dest, 1st operand, 2nd, accum, transferred, 2nd transferred
darm_reg_t Rd, Rn, Rm, Ra, Rt, Rt2;
// immediate operand
uint32_t imm;
// register shift info
darm_shift_type_t shift_type;
darm_reg_t Rs;
uint32_t shift;
// some instructions operate on bits and specify bits used
uint32_t lsb, msb, width;
// bitmask of registers affected by STM/LDM/PUSH/POP instr
uint16_t reglist;
} darm_t;
Listing 3.1: Snippet of darm’s decoded instruction (most common elements).
3.3 Implementation
TaintTrap is a prototype emulation framework built on TaintDroid 4.1.1, and is
implemented with 4000 lines of C code, not including the darm disassembler. One of
our primary objectives is to create a working prototype capable of running directly on
a smartphone, using existing software primitives and hardware. Building a prototype
provides a great level of understanding and insight into the fundamental challenges
of a practical system. This section outlines the implementation decisions, tradeoffs
and opportunities for improvement.
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3.3.1 Emulation Required Hooks
For emulation to function correctly, it requires knowledge of when a process starts or
exits, and when new threads are created or freed. This is achieved by adding hooks
to a select set of library calls, e.g. thread creation and teardown. Android uses a
process called Zygote that has been initialized and has all the core libraries linked
in. When a new application is started, a new VM is created by forking the Zygote
process, an operation that saves time and memory as libraries are shared. Given
that core libraries are read-only, at any given time there is a single copy in memory.
The select set of library calls is shown in Listing 3.2.
pid_t forkAndSpecializeCommon(const u4* args, bool isSystemServer)
void __thread_entry(int(*func)(void*), void *arg, void **tls)
void __bionic_clone_entry(int (*fn)(void *), void *arg)
void __bionic_atfork_run_child()
void _pthread_internal_free(pthread_internal_t* thread)
void _exit_thread(int retCode)
Listing 3.2: Hooked platform functions needed by emulation.
With the exception of Zygote’s fork implementation in dalvik.system.Zygote,
all other functions are part of libc’s Pthreads implementation and used by pub-
lic APIs (e.g. pthread_create and pthread_exit). In our implementation, we
modified the platform source code (considered trusted code) to insert needed hooks,
however it may be possible to dynamically hook functions with a mechanism like
LD_PRELOAD offered by the dynamic linker.
3.3.2 Memory Taint Map
The taint map needs to cover both the stack and the rest of a program’s memory such
as text and data segments, dynamically allocated memory via mmap, sbrk or malloc.
For performance reasons, TaintTrap linearly allocates the taint map from anonymous
virtual memory through mmap using the flags MAP_ANONYMOUS and MAP_NORESERVE
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which allows allocating more virtual memory than physical memory. Accessing the
taint tag for a given memory address is fast and requires directly indexing into the
taint map based on the offset computed from the given address and the starting
memory address covered by the taint map. While the taint maps need to cover
both current and potential future memory expansion, only a very small fraction of
memory is expected to become tainted and thus needing additional physical memory
compared to the program’s original memory requirements. If the available virtual
memory is insufficient for allocating the taint maps, alternative approaches can trade
off speed for smaller memory footprint: bitmaps and on-demand page level taint
storage allocation. In practice, TaintTrap allocates separate taint map for stack
memory. A lookup step at runtime determines the matching taint map based on the
desired address and information stored with each taint map identifying its type and
covered address range. A sample memory layout with allocated taint tag storage is
shown in Listing 3.3.
10000000 - 18000000 // Taint Tags (Stack)
20000000 - 40000000 // Text + Data
40000000 - 70000000 // Heap
70000000 - be800000 // Taint Tags (Non-Stack)
be800000 - bf000000 // Stack
ffff0000 - ffff1000 // Vectors
Listing 3.3: Example of program memory layout including taint tag storage.
The structure of a taint map is shown below in Listing 3.4:
struct taintmap_t {
uint32_t *data; /* mmap-ed data */
uint32_t start; /* address range start */
uint32_t end; /* address range end */
uint32_t bytes; /* (end - start) bytes */
taintpage_t *pages; /* taintpages */
};
Listing 3.4: Emulator taint map data structure.
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3.3.3 Architectural Registers’ Taint
The register taint map is implemented as a 16-element array for fast lookups and
indexing is performed with the register number: r0 to r15. Taint propagation
rules are similar to an instructions’ data movement. For example the instruction
add r0, r1, r2 performs r0 Ð r1 + r2 and Taint(r0) = Taint(r1) Y (r2),
where Y represents the union of two taint tags, which in our implementation is a
bitwise OR, same as in TaintDroid.
3.3.4 Protection Granularity
The mechanism we use to enforce tainted data access protection is traditional OS
Page Protections. Due to the coarse grain page granularity (4KB), we expect false
positives. Prior work on hardware support for fine grained memory protection in
the form of watchpoints [30] is a very promising match for TaintTrap as a way of
removing such false positives. The impact of protection granularity is measured in
detail in the evaluation section.
3.3.5 Protection Primitive
To change page protections TaintTrap uses the OS provided mprotect system call,
which allows changing the memory access protection for a region of memory. For
example, mprotect(0x1000, PAGE_SIZE, PROT_NONE) prevents any memory access
to the page located at address 0x1000. Any subsequent access to a tainted page
triggers a segmentation-fault signal (SIGSEGV). Conversely, instead of PROT_NONE, to
restore original protections after a page is no longer tainted, a combination of one or
more of PROT_READ, PROT_WRITE and PROT_EXEC allows a mix of read, write memory
access and code execution of the page.
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3.3.6 Tainting Memory
Whenever TaintTrap taints a piece of memory, if the data resides on a untainted
page, the page is immediately protected from subsequent memory accesses. This
ensures that if any other thread of the application tries to access the newly tainted
data, a TAP Fault triggers, providing the entry-point for emulation.
3.3.7 Untainting Memory
A memory read or write reference can only access and taint or untaint 1, 2 or 4 bytes
at a time. Instructions such as PUSH/POP, LDM/STM that load and store multiple
values are considered as making multiple memory references, one for each element.
However, protecting memory at the page-level prevents directly knowing if all the
non-written bytes on a page are non-tainted. It is prohibitively expensive to naively
scan all other 1023 words in the taint map. Instead, to efficiently detect when a
page is tainted and when it first becomes untainted, TaintTrap keeps a per-page
taint counter with values ranging from 0 to 1024, representing the number of word-
size tainted elements on a 4KB page. When the counter is first incremented from
0 to 1, the page is tainted and mprotect is called. Similarly, when the counter is
decremented from 1 to 0, the page becomes untainted, and mprotect is called to
restore the original page protections.
3.3.8 Special Cases
User-space emulation and taint tracking exposes a number of cases requiring special
handling. In this section we discuss some of the most interesting cases we observed.
Tainted Stack. On ARM the Stack Pointer (SP) can be used as a general
purpose register. Thus, it is possible for the SP to become tainted. In fact, we have
seen a legitimate switch statement on tainted data in jpeg exif benchmark. The
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switch statement switches on tainted data read from a file. Assembly instructions
modify the SP using a logical shift with the tainted value as immediate. This is a
legitimate use although it is more closely related to implicit flows. TaintTrap only
emulates explicit flows and hence ignores taint propagation using the SP.
Another stack special case is the stack itself becoming tainted and hence protected
from access. This can happen by legitimate register spills on the stack or during
function calls where registers are saved and restored. Saving a tainted register on
the stack is sufficient to protect the entire stack page around the value. This is not
a correctness issue but a performance one, since it results in additional work due to
false taint access traps when the remaining stack page is used, requiring TaintTrap
to check the faulting instruction for taint, single-step it and resume execution back
unmodified native code. A high number of watchpoints as proposed by prior work
[30], can alleviate the performance hit of false taint access traps.
Tainted Thread-Local Storage. The Linux Pthreads implementation stores
the Thread-Local Storage (TLS) data at the top of the stack. TLS is used for internal
state such as Thread ID and errno, or it can accessed through Pthreads APIs such
as pthread_key_create and pthread_{set,get}specific. Android’s Bionic libc
library allocates storage for up to 64 TLS slots of 32-bit each and the rest of the page
is used for stack frames. Hence, if the first stack page becomes tainted, accessing
TLS causes a TAP Fault. This is problematic since emulation also needs to access
TLS, which causes an infinite trap loop. To avoid trapping on the TLS data, we
allocate 1024 TLS slots, thus ensuring any tainted stack page does not overlap TLS
data. As this issue stems from a protection granularity limitation, watchpoints are
again a useful primitive to have that TaintTrap can benefit from.
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Trampolines. Since TaintTrap only emulates user-level instructions and since
it is not always running due to the nature of selective emulation, it needs some
assistance from the platform. TaintTrap relies trampolines to check for tainted data
its behalf and notify back if necessary. Consider an app that reads and writes a file
on the filesystem. The operations performed are read and write syscalls on a file
descriptor. If the file is tainted and TaintTrap is not already running for the thread
performing the syscall, it cannot notice the taint interaction. To solve this problem,
TaintTrap inserts trampolines in libc’s read and write functions (which already
exist as wrappers around the syscalls). The trampolines then transfer control to code
which checks if the source or destination buffers are tainted and if the file descriptor
is associated with a tainted file.
While trampolines add the required taint checks, they also expose a subtle issue.
Consider the potential callers for read/write:
1. App while executing without emulation (common case). This can be easily
handled by making sure the taint logic checks for a thread-local running flag
that is set while emulation is running. When the flag is not set (no emulation
underway), trampolines are responsible for checking taint, otherwise trampoline
taint checks are skipped as they are performed during instruction emulation.
2. App while under emulation. Since the app is already under emulation when
it calls read/write, the taint propagation logic part of the trampoline gets
emulated. While not a correctness issue, this is a major performance issue
that TaintTrap addresses. The problem is complicated by the stack poten-
tially being tainted and trapping on access, preventing any trampoline taint
check bypass logic from executing as any subsequent function call would trap.
TaintTrap’s workaround leverages the fact that for emulation, each thread has
a dedicated alternate stack that is never protected. Thus, instead of running
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the bypass logic on the regular stack, it is run on the TaintTrap stack through
the use of a TLS-based side channel. Trampolines check if the current stack
frame is tainted/protected before attempting to run any taint checks, and if
tainted, request it be performed on the dedicated stack by recording what taint
checking function needs to be called then raising a trap using a specially crafted
undefined instruction that is delivered as a SIGILL to TaintTrap. This ensures
that TaintTrap can distinguish between a common SIGSEGV on tainted data
access triggering emulation, versus a request to call a function on its stack and
resume execution.
3. TaintTrap for its own use (not requested by app). This can only happen due
to TaintTrap’s distinct usage of libraries, for example writing the execution
instruction trace. In this case TaintTrap never directly manipulates an app’s
tainted data and hence trampoline taint checks need to be skipped. One so-
lution is to make sure TaintTrap does not call these trampolines directly by
avoiding use of any libraries used by the app (e.g. libc) and instead relying
on syscalls directly.
Accessing Tainted Memory. While page protections prevent an app from
accessing tainted data by forcing emulation, they unfortunately prevent emulation
itself from accessing memory on tainted pages. If TaintTrap directly performs loads
and stores within a tainted page, it causes another SIGSEGV (TAP Fault), leading to
an infinite loop. While emulation can use mprotect to give back rights, perform the
load or store, then restore restricted access, it requires two syscalls for each mem-
ory operation making it expensive. However, a correctness issue arises since other
non-emulated threads could temporarily access a tainted page while one emulated
thread is manipulating the protections and data for the same page. For this reason,
TaintTrap always keeps tainted pages protected from access but uses an additional
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mechanism to be able to read and write memory without issuing user-level loads and
stores. The Linux kernel provides a procfs mechanism under /proc/self/mem that
allows an app to read its own memory using standard read and write syscalls on
a file descriptor. This is used by debuggers like GDB to set and change software
breakpoints.
The code in Listing 3.5 shows how to read a value at address ptr and return it in
val. Note that opening the file descriptor is a one-time operation. We can aggregate
the lseek and read syscalls into a single pread syscall, which allows reading a file
descriptor at a given offset. Similarly we use pwrite instead of lseek and write. A
code snippet that uses pread is shown in Listing 3.6.
int fd = open("/proc/self/mem", O_RDWR); // one-time cost
lseek(fd, ptr, SEEK_SET);
read(fd, &val, sizeof(val));
Listing 3.5: Using /proc/self/mem to read memory: two syscalls per access.
int fd = open("/proc/self/mem", O_RDWR); // one-time cost
pread(fd, &val, sizeof(val), offset);
Listing 3.6: Using /proc/self/mem to read memory: one syscall per access.
From a security perspective, the /proc/self/mem mechanism does not give an
app more privileges than it already has, it allows an app to read and write its own
memory, which it is able to regardless of the mechanism. If a page is protected, a
malicious adversary can unprotect the page before accessing it with loads and stores.
The kernel implementation of pread/pwrite, requires finding a free page, call-
ing copy_from_user if handling a pwrite, access_remote_vm, and copy_to_user
if handling pread. In this case access_remote_vm is a very expensive operation.
Normally the function is used to access any process’ virtual memory, although in our
case we are accessing memory in the calling process.
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The kernel’s implementation is shown in Listing 3.7. The kernel uses copy to/from
functions since it is not allowed to directly read user-level memory. The special
functions leverage the Memory Management Unit (MMU) and account for faults
due to invalid memory mappings or permissions.
The current limitation on accessing tainted and protected memory exposes an
opportunity: TaintTrap may avoid the kernel workaround by protecting memory
at the user-level but emulating the hypervisor level with direct access to tainted
memory, avoiding costly tainted memory accesses.
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ssize_t mem_rw(struct file *file, char __user *buf,
size_t count, loff_t *ppos, int write)
{
struct mm_struct *mm = file->private_data;
unsigned long addr = *ppos;
ssize_t copied;
char *page;
if (!mm)
return 0;
page = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_TEMPORARY);
if (!page)
return -ENOMEM;
copied = 0;
if (!atomic_inc_not_zero(&mm->mm_users))
goto free;
while (count > 0) {
int this_len = min_t(int, count, PAGE_SIZE);
if (write && copy_from_user(page, buf, this_len)) {
copied = -EFAULT;
break;
}
this_len = access_remote_vm(mm, addr, page, this_len, write);
if (!this_len) {
if (!copied)
copied = -EIO;
break;
}
if (!write && copy_to_user(buf, page, this_len)) {
copied = -EFAULT;
break;
}
buf += this_len;
addr += this_len;
copied += this_len;
count -= this_len;
}
*ppos = addr;
mmput(mm);
free:
free_page((unsigned long) page);
return copied;
}
Listing 3.7: Kernel code of pread/pwrite on Android Linux Kernel 3.0.31.
Tainted Atomic Sequences. ARM does not provide a single atomic instruc-
tion that can update memory. Instead it offers a general synchronization primitive
that splits atomically updating memory into two steps with the help of exclusive
monitors. First, the LDREX (Load-Exclusive) instruction loads a word from memory
and updates the exclusive monitor to track the synchronization operation. Second,
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the STREX (Store-Exclusive) instruction conditionally stores a word to memory. If
the executing processor’s exclusive monitor permits, the store updates memory and
returns the value 0, otherwise it does not update memory and returns the value 1.
Consider the pseudocode shown in Listing 3.8 that performs an atomic incre-
ment. While the atomic increment code performs as expected in a non-emulated
environment, it is possible that under emulation the page containing the ptr ad-
dress is tainted and hence protected from memory access. If the page is tainted,
upon attempting to execute the LDREX instruction, a TAP Fault triggers emula-
tion but unfortunately the only way to emulate a synchronization primitive is with
another primitive. If TaintTrap’s emulation attempts to execute a crafted LDREX
and STREX to the same address, it faults again causing an infinite loop. To avoid
the delicate situation, TaintTrap instead uses a per-thread Pthreads mutex that is
only locked and unlocked during emulation, while memory is read and written using
/proc/self/mem’s pread and pwrite instead (which does not fault even if the page
is protected). The mutex is locked before emulating the LDREX and unlocked after
emulating the STREX.
int32_t
__bionic_atomic_inc(volatile int32_t* ptr) {
int32_t prev, tmp, status;
do {// assembly
ldrex prev, [ptr]
add tmp, prev, 1
strex status, tmp, [ptr]
} while (status != 0);
return prev;
}
Listing 3.8: Atomic increment from libc using LDREX/STREX primitive.
Emulation of tainted atomic sequences suffers from a similar limitation to the one
previously seen when accessing tainted memory. The same approach of performing
memory accesses and emulation at the hypervisor level may avoid the special case
handling currently required and reduce overheads.
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Prefetching. Any emulated prefetched instructions, PLD (preload data) and
PLI (preload instruction), are likely to no longer have their desired benefit due to
emulation interference. Hence, TaintTrap ignores prefetch instructions and treats
them as NOPs, without having any impact on execution correctness.
Page Protection Permissions. To restore page permissions when a page be-
comes untainted, TaintTrap needs to save the page permissions at the time when
the page was last tainted. This is necessary since protecting a tainted page requires
removing all existing permissions. Unfortunately, Linux does not provide an efficient
mechanism for a user-level application to query the permissions for specific page. In-
stead the kernel offers a procfs based mechanism which requires reading and parsing
a text file representation located at /proc/self/maps. This file is updated by the
kernel when memory is allocated for a process. Using this file method is very slow and
incorrect for multi-threaded applications since the file cannot be locked for changes
while it is being read.
A solution is to either 1) extend the kernel to provide page protection query,
or 2) keep track of memory allocations performed via mmap and sbrk system calls
and any non-emulation specific mprotect calls that could change these protections.
TaintTrap favors the latter approach instead of changing the kernel.
3.3.9 Prototype Limitations
TaintTrap’s prototype implementation has a few non-fundamental limitations as it
does not currently have emulation support for:
• Vector SIMD instructions. We observed these instructions in some Bionic
libc optimizations such as memcpy and disabled SIMD support by undefin-
ing __ARM_HAVE_NEON.
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• Vector Floating Point (VFP) in 3rd party apps. System libraries that did
use VFP were recompiled with gcc’s -mfloat-abi=soft to enable software
emulation. Bionic libc required undefining __ARM_HAVE_VFP.
• Coprocessor instructions. In system library code we have observed a single use
of these instructions: accessing the Thread ID inside TLS. We only support
this special case.
3.4 Evaluation
The main questions we want to answer are: 1) does TaintTrap work and propagate
taint for native code?; and 2) can TaintTrap be used on a real device? The current
TaintTrap prototype, even with its limitations, runs on a Galaxy Nexus smartphone
and is able to detect, intercept and propagate taint for a set of programs. In this
section we explore the main causes of overhead in the current implementation of
TaintTrap, discuss opportunities for improvement and use a performance model to
gauge their benefit if applied to TaintTrap.
3.4.1 Benchmarks
We consider three micro-benchmarks to gauge TaintTrap’s overhead: password,
matrix, and jpeg-exif:
• password, represents a minimal example of leaking a user’s password through
a native code file system write call. It is used to test tracking functionality
across files. TaintTrap captures and flags the leak by tainting the file with the
stolen password. Listing 3.9 shows the micro-benchmark code.
• matrix, simulates variable sized tainted data and computation through the use
of a classic three loop matrix multiply (AˆB “ C) and with adjustable taint,
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ranging from tainting one row to all rows of the matrix A. TaintTrap propagates
taint to the corresponding rows of the result matrix C. Measurements are
gathered for the inner loop and do not include the allocation, initialization and
initial one-time tainting of the input.
• jpeg-exif, is based on an observed native code use case seen in the Insta-
gram app, where after the user takes a camera picture, it is saved to disk and
processed using native code. Instagram first uses libjhead library to parse
and extract the extended JPEG metadata (EXIF), and then applies a cus-
tom image filter. We reproduced the parsing of the JPEG EXIF phase as
standalone micro-benchmark. TaintTrap intercepts the use of a tainted image
file and tracks tainted data usage throughout the parsing phase. Unlike the
first two benchmarks, jpeg-exif includes libc read/write as well as atomic
sequences, which are handled correctly by TaintTrap.
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// Application Dalvik VM Code (Java)
public boolean authenticate() {
// platform trusted API for input
String password = user_input();
// untrusted 3rd party app code
return native_authenticate(password);
}
// Application Native Code (C/C++)
bool native_authenticate(char *password) {
hide(password);
return login(password);
}
void hide(char *password) {
char stash[MAX_LEN];
int c = 0;
while(password[c] != ’\0’) {
// obfuscate/hash password
stash[c] = password[c] - 32;
c++;
}
// stash password on filesystem
int fd = open("leak.tmp", O_CREAT|O_RDWR);
write(fd, stash, c);
close(fd);
}
# Example password
$ echo ’t0psecr3t!@#’ | xxd
0000000: 7430 7073 6563 7233 7421 4023 0a t0psecr3t!@#.
# Obfuscated password (subtract 0x20)
$ xxd cache.tmp
0000000: 5410 5053 4543 5213 5401 2003 T.PSECR.T. .
Listing 3.9: Password leak test case.
A comprehensive set of statistics for each of the benchmarks is shown in Table 3.1.
For each of the 3 benchmarks, a comparison is made between Selective Emulation
(SE), where TaintTrap performs taint tracking and emulation only as needed, and
Full Emulation (FE), where TaintTrap is continuously running from start to finish.
The main observation is that coarse grain memory protection results in a high num-
ber of expensive taint traps, up to 96% for jpeg-exif. In this case most of the false
traps are caused by protecting the stack due to one or more tainted values being
temporarily left on the stack. Since the stack is frequently used during execution,
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false traps result in a major cause of performance overhead. For matrix, a compar-
ison of compiler optimizations levels (O0 vs O3) shows how in the optimized case
(O3), the matrix inner loop is tuned such that at any given time there is at least a
tainted register, preventing TaintTrap from turning itself off in the SE case. In the
unoptimized O0 case, SE can turn itself off but half of the traps are false taint traps
due to protection granularity.
Table 3.1: TaintTrap comparison of Full Emulation (FE) and Selective Emulation
(SE) with per event breakdown.
Benchmark Count
Event password matrix (O0) matrix (O3) jpeg-exif
SE FE SE FE SE FE SE FE
emulated instructions 124 149 859,297 1,180,265 227,815 227,883 172,855 241,291
emulated load instructions 17 20 561,248 672,048 112,794 112,827 24,732 30,554
emulated store instructions 13 13 68,671 69,699 5,243 5,262 13,179 14,270
emulated atomic sequences - - - - - - 22 30
traps 6 - 136,351 - 3 - 13,379 -
traps on stack access 5 - 69,792 - 0 - 12,654 -
traps non-stack hit % 16.7 - 24.0 - 33.3 - 0.4 -
traps stack hit % 0 - 0.8 - 0 - 2.7 -
traps non-stack miss % 0 - 24.8 - 66.7 - 5.1 -
traps stack miss % 83.3 - 50.4 - 0 - 91.9 -
memory read refs total 29 25 561,248 672,048 112,802 112,827 44,814 51,723
memory write refs total 28 21 68,671 69,699 5,243 5,262 35,469 37,620
memory read refs tainted 12 12 65,536 65,536 32,768 32,768 14,508 14,502
memory write refs tainted 9 9 33,792 33,792 1,024 1,024 10,053 10,047
trampoline read total 0 0 - - - - 3 3
trampoline write total 1 1 - - - - 55 55
trampoline stack taint 0 0 - - - - 7 -
trampoline taint read 0 0 - - - - 3 3
trampoline taint write 0 0 - - - - 53 53
page protection updates 1 1 2,049 2,049 10 10 54 54
tainted reg instructions 24 24 131072 131072 65536 65536 35059 35059
tainted mem instructions 12 12 33792 33792 1024 1024 10965 10959
tainted instructions % 38.7 32.2 19.2 14.0 29.2 29.2 26.7 19.1
3.4.2 False Positives
Instead of emulating the entire program (Full Emulation) to add taint tracking,
TaintTrap’s Selective Emulation design aims to only emulate instructions that are
required for taint tracking correctness and revert to native/unmodified execution
when no longer necessary. There are two scenarios that can artificially increase
TaintTrap’s number of instructions that require emulation:
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1. Taint trap false positives. Due to page protection granularity, when only part
of a page is tainted and a memory access is performed on the non-tainted
region, a trap can still be raised, requiring TaintTrap to check if tainted data
is accessed and to single-step (emulate) the faulting instruction.
2. Tainted registers. To ensure tracking correctness, although the instruction
being emulated may not access and propagate taint, TaintTrap is unable to
revert to unmodified native code while any CPU registers are marked as tainted.
To measure the impact of these two cases, we used the matrix micro-benchmark
with dynamically allocated matrix storage. First, for each matrix row memory is
allocated through malloc, resulting in sequential memory allocations in our case
and thus being susceptible to taint trap false positives. Second, mmap is used instead
for allocation, resulting in dedicated pages for each row, thus removing any taint trap
false positives when an entire row is tainted. As a lower bound, the ideal smallest
number of instructions emulated is determined by counting only the instructions that
strictly propagate taint through registers and memory. However, achieving this in a
real system is impractical.
The results are shown in Figure 3.2, comparing the emulated instruction counts
for Selective Emulation. Sequential allocation results in false positive traps while
allocating with mmap ensures each row resides on a dedicated page, removing false
positive traps. Ideal (lower bound) strictly represents only the instructions that
propagate taint.
The less amount of taint, the higher the impact of coarse grain protection false
traps, while at the far end when the entire input is tainted, TaintTrap’s Selective
Emulation ability is unused and the system becomes equivalent to performing Full
Emulation.
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Figure 3.2: Impact of false positives due to memory protection granularity de-
pending on sequential allocation (malloc) versus page-aligned (mmap).
3.4.3 TaintTrap Overheads
To better understand the underlying components of TaintTrap we measured the
overheads of system operations such as signals, traps and pread/pwrite, relative to
a null syscall. The overheads are shown in Figure 3.3 where each overhead is the
average of at least 10000 operations. As seen, our workaround for accessing tainted
data through the help of the kernel’s pread/pwrite incurs significant overhead. In
our measurements, we find a noticeable difference between the pread and pwrite
times, where writing is more expensive than reading. This is possibly caused by
the read path being cached while the write requires additional work to flush and
propagate the new data.
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Figure 3.3: System average overhead for various operations compared to null-
syscall.
To better see the impact of the using pread/pwrite for accessing tainted data, we
measure the breakdown between user and kernel time for our jpeg-exif benchmark.
The results are shown in Figure 3.4. TaintTrap’s workaround for accessing tainted
memory through kernel help (/proc/self/mem), significantly impacts performance
seen in the increased kernel time fraction.
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Figure 3.4: Application time spent in user or kernel for jpeg-exif without taint
tracking (left) and with taint tracking (right).
Another important metric in understanding TaintTrap’s behavior is found by
observing the total amount of tainted memory throughout a program’s execution.
As seen in Figure 3.5, about 15-40% of the entire memory references are for tainted
data. This is to be expected given the nature of our micro-benchmarks focusing on
accessing and manipulating tainted data. However, in a real app use case, the fraction
of tainted memory references is expected to be much lower as is likely dominated by
regular non-tainted flows.
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Figure 3.5: Memory references for tainted data over entire execution.
3.4.4 Accelerating Taint Tracking
One of TaintTrap’s implementation objectives is to run on existing devices, and to
achieve this with existing software support. However, it is important to consider how
TaintTrap may evolve in future systems. For example, eliminating taint access false-
positives and the resulting overhead, TaintTrap can take advantage of Dune [31],
which exposes privileged CPU features, including page tables, to user-level applica-
tions. This can significantly reduce the performance overhead of managing and pro-
tecting tainted data. Although TaintTrap makes use of existing memory protection
(mprotect), the coarse protection granularity can be detrimental to performance.
However, prior work on fine-grained memory protection through watchpoints [30],
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can be very beneficial to TaintTrap’s approach. Watchpoints can be used efficiently
used and modified directly from user-code. Additional hardware support in the form
of range caches provide great performance for watchpoint operations [32]. Coupled
with user-level traps, TaintTrap’s selective emulation can be very practical for many
real world use cases involving sensitive data on mobile devices, without having to
sacrifice performance and battery life for the common case of apps not interacting
with sensitive data. For additional security, TaintTrap could run at the hypervisor
level. A hypervisor helps isolate the emulator and its state from the program being
instrumented, and provides strong guarantees for tracking malicious apps without
the risk of TaintTrap being subverted.
3.4.5 Performance Model
To understand the impact of potential improvements to TaintTrap, we consider a
simple performance model where overheads can be adjusted separately. For example,
user-level faults can significantly reduce the trap overhead, a hypervisor accessing
taint no longer requires expensive pread/pwrite operations and hence lowers the
overhead of accessing tainted and protected memory.
The starting point for the model comes from benchmarking individual TaintTrap
operations, shown in Table 3.2. For example, TEmu represents the average overhead
of emulating an instruction, including disassembly time TDisassembly which represents
half the time. Changing the memory protection bits for a page (4K) using mprotect
is represented by TProtect. Taking a taint trap results in handling a SIGSEGV which
is represented by TTrap.
More formally, we model the execution time as follows:
Modeled Execution Time (MET) =
(# traps) ˆ pTTrapq +
(# mem read + # mem write) ˆ TCheckTaintPage +
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Table 3.2: Measured average cycle overheads for TaintTrap internal operations.
Event Symbol Cycles
Processor cycles per instruction TCPI 1.25
Read tag for single address TGetTaintTag 25
Check if page is tainted TCheckTaintPage 20
Disassemble one instruction TDisassembly 100
Emulate one instruction without taint TEmu 200
Emulate one instruction with memory taint TEmuTaint 20,000
Read tainted memory using pread TGetTaintMem 40,000
Write tainted memory using pwrite TSetTaintMem 70,000
Allocate temporary buffer (4K) TAllocBuffer 8,000
Change memory protection bits (4K) TProtect 10,000
Taint Access Protection (TAP) Fault TTrap 12,000
Check if memory range is tainted (4K) TGetTaintBuffer 4,000
Write taint for memory range (4K) TSetTaintBuffer 7,600
Check if file descriptor is tainted TGetTaintFile 200,000
Taint file descriptor TSetTaintF ile 210,000
(# taint mem read + # taint mem write) ˆ pTTaintAccess ` TTaintMemAccessq +
(# page protection updates) ˆ TProtect +
(# instructions) ˆ pTCPI ` TEmuq
The MET above includes the execution time without emulation: (# instructions)
ˆ pTCPIq.
We explore four scenarios, each subsequent one making additional improvements:
1. Selective Emulation + Taint: The current implementation of TaintTrap using
the expensive pread/pwrite for tainted memory access. The exact overheads
are taken from the measurements seen in Table 3.2 with the exception that we
model read and writes as taking the same time, specifically TTaintMemAccess is
TSetTaintMem.
2. Fast Taint: Quick access to tainted data is crucial to system overhead. From
prior work, we model the availability of watchpoints [30] and consider TTaintMemAccess
and TTrap as 20 cycles.
3. Fast Emulation: Another major component to TaintTrap overheads is the emu-
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lation overhead per instruction, TEmu. The current prototype does not yet take
advantage of typical improvements such as caching the disassembly, emulating
basic blocks instead of single instructions or saving and re-using the emulation
work with Just-In-Time (JIT) compilation. We model such improvements as
TEmu per instruction taking 20 cycles, although we believe this can be more
aggressively reduced.
4. Selective Emulation (Ideal): As a lower-bound, we model emulation of bare
minimum instructions (only instructions that propagate taint), although this
is not practical to implement particularly for tight loops like our matrix micro-
benchmark which can add additional overheads to enable/disable emulation for
each iteration, which we do not model.
The performance model is applied using profiling information from the matrix
micro-benchmark, using O3 optimizations. The information includes how many in-
structions need emulation and access tainted data. The performance model system
overhead estimates are shown in Figure 3.6. Each of the four scenarios are compared
across variable taint ratios of the input matrix A. For the matrix benchmark, taint-
ing 100% of matrix A results in an overall dynamic taint access fraction of almost
30%.
The most interesting data point is the Fast Emulation variant, representing a
version of TaintTrap that improves on the existing selective emulation by leveraging
watchpoints together with more efficient emulation. We find the results to be very
encouraging, as we expect the common case for apps to have dynamic fractions of
tainted data accessed around or well under 1%. For example, the password leak is
under 200 instructions, a negligible amount compared to over 1 billion instructions
a second executed by the processor (Galaxy Nexus runs at 1.2GHz and most ARM
instructions have an average CPI of 1 cycle). We believe TaintTrap can be practical
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and very useful for running on real mobile devices, where it efficiently runs in the
rare case when needed, and does not impact the perceived user experience, in the
common case when apps do not interact with the user’s sensitive data.
3.5 Related Work
Dynamic taint analysis (DTA) has been an active research area since the pioneering
work on information-flow tracking by Denning [1] in the 70s. There are three main
approaches used to implement taint tracking: instrumentation-based, interpreter-
based and architecture-based. We discuss each of these below and focus on the
flexibility and overhead of taint tracking.
Instrumentation-based systems. These systems generally leverage one of
the available dynamic binary-rewriting frameworks available: Pin [33–35], Valgrind
[36], Dynamo, DynamoRIO, StarDBT. A limitation of using these frameworks is that
they only support process level taint tracking.. The approach is limited to user-level
applications and instrumentation overhead is generally significant, prohibiting real
time usage on a smartphone. Systems that provide full-system taint tracking use
virtualization or emulation such as offered by Xen or QEMU, also have significant
overheads [27, 37–40].
Most systems only provide support for 1-bit tags but still incur a significant over-
head [7, 41]. Other systems make use of very architectural specific features to improve
overheads but end up suffering from lack of wide-spread applicability or restrictions.
Minemu [42] implements a fast taint-tracking x86 process-based emulator which sup-
ports one byte taint tags for each byte of emulated process memory. Although it
achieves low overheads between 1.5x and 3x by using SSE registers to avoid register
spills and store tags, it is specific to 32-bit x86 code and requires SSE extensions
making their implementation non-portable and unable to support applications using
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SSE instructions. LIFT [43] has 1-bit tags and extending to multi-bit tags signifi-
cantly increases the memory overhead. LIFT uses the StartDBT binary translator
which translates IA32 instructions to EM64T instructions since like with Minemu,
EM64T has more registers than IA32, avoiding register spills for performance gains.
Finally LIFT does not support multi-threading or implicit flows and does not work
on 32-bit systems.
Like TaintDroid and TaintTrap, most systems only support explicit flows. Im-
plicit flow support has been proposed in Dytan [8] for x86, which uses Pin mak-
ing the overheads impractical for a mobile device. It leverages statically-computed
post-dominance information and requires adding spurious definitions to make the
memory definitions on both sides of a branch equal. The reported time overhead
for data flows is 30x and including control flows it is 50x, while the space overhead
is 240x. Another system, DTA++ [9] implemented on top of BitBlaze framework,
targets implicit flows that can lead to under-tainting and uses symbolic execution
but requires slow whole-system emulation. Other work has added support for limited
types of implicit flows in the context of detecting security exploits [44].
Dynamic taint analysis has been used to determine privacy exposure [10, 45] as
well as to track Internet worms [46]. Similar to TaintTrap’s taint access protection,
libdft [40] is built over Pin and uses page protections to block a tracked program from
accidentally corrupting Pin or libdft. On-demand emulation and page protections
have also been explored but in an environment with virtualization with Xen and
emulation with QEMU [47].
Interpreter- or VM-based. TaintDroid [6] implements system-wide information-
flow tracking with variable data object granularities ranging from one tag per variable
or register to one tag per file. The tags are stored stored as a 32-bit bitvector and
variable tags are adjacent in memory for spatial locality. It is specifically designed
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for the unique constraints of Android smartphones and thus taint propagation logic
is implemented inside Android’s Dalvik VM interpreter which makes it significantly
more coarse grain than previous work where taint is done at the machine binary level.
This has the benefit of very small overheads, 14-27% performance overhead and 3.5%
memory overhead. TaintDroid however, is unable to monitor information-flows in
native code.
Many language-specific optimizations have been proposed such as fine-grain char-
acter level taint tracking for Java [48]. Other systems have targeted JVM, PHP,
Python and SQL. Laminar [49] offers decentralized information-flow control by pro-
viding language extensions for JVM and a security library. It also requires the help
of programmer annotations which is not applicable in our environment.
Architecture-based Many hardware extensions and designs have been pro-
posed to aid information-flow tracking. A majority only offer 1-bit tags for every
physical memory word [50–53].
Raksha [52] is among the most configurable hardware DIFT implementations but
does not support full-system information-flow (does not cover the operating system).
Raksha supports tags per 4-bit tags per 32-bit where tags are 4-bit where each bit
represents a security policy with distinct propagation rules and checks. Another
key feature is that security exceptions are processed at the user-level avoiding an
expensive switch to kernel mode. Whenever an exception is triggered, the hardware
maintains its current privilege level and activates trusted mode . It then invokes the
handler in the same address space as the application.
Tiwari et al. [32] address the performance critical component in all hardware
DIFT architectures, the on-chip tag cache. Specifically they address the problem
of storing and querying large multi-bit tags efficiently. They propose the Range
Cache which provides support for fine-grain tracking up to the byte level, flexible
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tracking granularities with per-byte or per-word tags, and efficient on-chip storage
of large multi-bit tags of 32-bit or larger. The work is based on the observation that
tag bits exhibit a very high degree of spatial-value locality: large contiguous blocks
of memory addresses store the same tag value. Thus, the Range Cache associates
tags with ranges of addresses instead of individual addresses. Mondrian Memory
Protection (MMP) [54] has been proposed to reduce tag storage overhead by offering
a compact in-memory representation. It offers word-level granularity access control
using a protection look-aside buffer. MMP is designed for tools that do not perform
frequent updates. MMP similarly associates metadata with ranges of addresses but
is limited to allocations defined directly through malloc, free or page boundaries.
Another limitation of MMP is that ranges have to be aligned power-of-two sized
which complicates the discovery of contiguous ranges as well as range split or merge
operations. In contrast, Range Cache provides support for very fast range split,
merge and update without any alignment restrictions.
One of the challenges that prevents wide-spread adoption of specialized hardware
for dynamic software systems is that each of the different analysis types require highly
specific hardware support. A generalized acceleration mechanism has a higher chance
of being integrated in a commercial processor.
To address this opportunity, Greathouse et al. [30] argue for data watchpoints as a
primitive useful in a large number of analyses including Dynamic Dataflow Analysis,
Deterministic Concurrent Execution and Data Race Detection. In particular, they
propose hardware support that provides software the ability to set virtually unlim-
ited watchpoints. Watchpoints can be byte-accurate or cover any range of memory
addresses. For performance reasons, they use two key mechanisms to enable on chip
caching of watchpoints: a modified range cache (RC) proposed by Tiwari et al. [32]
and a Watchpoint Lookaside Buffer (WLB). The RC handles large ranges of watch-
points efficiently but is not good for small watchpoint regions. To overcome that
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limitation a bitmap is used for compact representation and to avoid going out to
memory to search the bitmap, the WLB is used to cache these accesses.
Dune [31] uses virtualization extensions to provide user-level access to privileged
CPU features including the page table. This can be a very beneficial addition to
TaintTrap. iWatcher [55] provides watchpoint-like support by leveraging thread-
level speculation (TLS). TaintBochs [56] tracks sensitive information at the whole-
system level with the goal of analyzing data lifetime. RIFLE [57] converts implicit
to explicit flows with the help of a dynamic binary translation (DBT) by trading off
coding restrictions. FlexiTaint [58] separates the storage of processing of taints from
data. Minos [51] provides integrity bits and propagation logic that prevents control
flow hijacking. Loki [59] aims to reduce the trusted computing base in a system
and provides guarantees even in the presence of a compromised OS by using tagged
memory support. Each 32-bit word is associated a 32-bit tag and a permissions cache
is stores the set of tag values.
Parallel approaches have also been proposed: Speck [60] accelerates security
checks using multiple cores. For taint analysis they support only 1-bit tags and
in the best case report a 2x speedup using 8 cores relative to their own implemen-
tation of TaintCheck using Pin (which has 18x overhead). This places Speck clearly
outside the space of real-time usage for smartphones. Ruwase et al. [61] propose
a parallel yet relaxed DIFT implemented over a Log-Based Architecture (LBA). It
only tracks flows through unary operations and supports 1-bit tags. Their work can
reduce overhead to as low as 1.2x but requires 9 monitoring cores on 16-core chip
multiprocessor and extensive hardware support for LBA, making it infeasible in a
smartphone setting.
Other low-level hardware approaches have considered building a new design from
the ground up and proposed gate-Level information-flow tracking [62] having the
benefit of supporting explicit, implicit and timing flows. The tradeoff is in area
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increases of 70%, harder to program and is computationally less powerful than tra-
ditional processors.
Panorama [63] offers whole-system DIFT aiming to support off-line malware de-
tection and analysis. The reported overhead is an average 20x and the system is too
heavy-weight for a resource constrained smartphone. HDL have also been designed
from the ground up with the goal of secure information-flow [64].
3.6 Conclusions
We extended the state of the art in dynamic information flow tracking on Android by
creating a practical system built around on-demand native code emulation. Taint-
Trap is designed to leverage the common case for smartphone apps, where sensitive
data is rarely and briefly accessed. To address performance overheads, we explored
potential improvements building on prior work that could be very beneficial to our
system. Given the results, TaintTrap can be practical for safeguarding user’s sensitive
data on a mobile device, without impacting the overall experience. Since TaintTrap
works at the binary level, no source code or developer effort is required to support
our system, allowing for simple deployment.
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